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ABSTRACT
There has been a rise in religious nationalism over the past two decades 
throughout the world. This study will focus on one political party that has gained 
much of its popularity through the appeal to Hindu nationalism: The Bharatiya Janata 
Party of India ( The BJP). This study will use James Darseys catalytic event model to 
study the events that have shaped the BJP, the rhetorical periods that these events 
spurred, and the values o f the BJP during these periods. This study has also 
incorporated "The Evil" from Robert Frykenbergs model to attempt to show what 
group the BJP criticizes during each period.
ui
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
India is often referred to as "the country o f tolerance” by world leaders around the 
world, but this label is actualfy a ntyth propagated by the Indian government many years 
ago in an attempt to maintain stability. This label has been shown to be opposite to 
anything that India has experienced since the beginning o f the 1980's (Mahmood, 1993). 
Until recently, the Indian government successfully maintained the appearance o f stability. 
However, India has experienced more ethnic strife from 1980 to 1997 than it did from 
1949, the year that India was recognized as a country, to 1979 (Swany, December 18,
1996). The BJP ( Bharattya Janata Party o f India) is a Hindu nationalist party that has 
tended to be at the center o f the problems that India has friced over the last 15 years. L.K. 
Advani, a leader o f the BJP, has said, ‘‘We are creating a nationalist force in the country— 
we are changing the nature o f politics...Nehru said, ‘We shall crush [the Hindu 
movement].’ I say we shall crush the crushing mentality...This is our war, our revolt.” 
(Coll, January 2, 1991).
India is now at an historic crossroads which pits the BJP and its anti-secular allies 
against the Congress Party o f India and its secular allies (Ayoob, 1996). The most recent 
confrrontation between the groups occurred in the spring o f 1996, when the BJP ruled 
India for one week. The BJP was not able to gain a majority or form a coalition
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India and thus this is an inqwrtant time to look at the possible future rulers o f India, since 
future policy makers around the world may have to deal with the BJP in the near future.
PURPOSE
The purpose o f this study is to anafyze the rhetoric surroundmg politics in India, 
specifically, rhetoric o f the BJP. The intent o f this study is to argue that there are catalytic 
events that have shaped the BJP and the values that it believes in and promotes. I will use 
James Darsey's (1991) catatytic event model to discover and the examine the catalytic 
events, the eras that the catalytic events create, and the values o f the BJP within the 
rhetorical periods that the catalytic events create. Finally, I will attendit to outline the 
future o f the BJP and reveal if they will truly rule India before the end o f this century.
JUSTIFICATION
This study is o f value for two reasons. First, although much research has been done in 
the area o f social movements, there is a lack o f scholar^, both communication and non­
communication oriented, research on Hindu nationalism in general, and the BJP 
specifically. Most scholarty research is found in political science journals. These articles 
mainly focused on the BJP over a short time fi-ame within the movement. The articles did 
not look at any prolonged time periods. The dearth o f research within the communication 
field is surprising. Because o f a lack o f previous research, this essay will hopefiilty bring 
about a new understanding o f a group and culture that has not been studied by
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3communication scholars. This new research will bring to light aspects o f this culture so 
that researchers may understand the culture and the group more.
Second, I believe that India is an important country to study in this time o f ethnic 
conflict throughout the world. For forty-eight years India has balanced the interest o f 
Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Jains, Muslims, Sikhs, and numerous other religious and 
ethnic groups. It is remarkable that a country like India has remained relatively stable, and 
much can be learned by looking at ethnic movements within Indian society. Without 
knowledge o f ethnic conflict around the world, it will be much harder for world leaders to 
solve ethnic conflict.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature reviewed for this thesis foils into three categories: 1) studies focusing on 
investigations o f social movements; 2) literature which contains studies focusing on 
Hinduism and Indian politics; 3) Popular magazines and newsp^iers which focus on Indian 
politics.
Social Movement Liteianas
Leland GrifBn’s (1969) essay, “The Dramatists Theory o f the Rhetoric o f Social 
Movements”, examines the progression o f social movements over time. In this essay 
GrifBn argues that to study a social movement, “is to study a progress, a rhetorical 
striving, a becoming. It is progress from stasis to stasis...” (pp. 461-462). In effect,
GrifSn argues that every movemrat is (tivuied into a series o f stages.
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4James Darsty (1991) in his essay, “ From ‘Gay is good’ to the Scourge o f AIDS: The 
Evolution o f Gay Liberation Rhetoric, 1977-1990", has taken GrifiBn’s anafysis further by 
arguing that every movement is shaped by catafytic events. These catalytic events, “( 1 ) 
are historical rather than ihetorical, (2) are nontactical (either extraneous to the movement 
in origin, spontaneous in origin, or both), (3) achieve tremendous significance for the 
movement, and (4) precede rhetorical responses that constitute demonstrably discrete 
internally homogeneous rhetorical eras” (p 46). More will be said about James Darsey and 
the catalytic event theory in the Method section.
Mary G. McEdwards(1968) article, “Aghative Rhetoric: Its Nature and Effect”, 
investigates social movements and the use o f aghative rhetoric to achieve their goals. 
McEdwards states that a social movement always evokes “extreme movement fi’om the 
status quo.” McEdwards argues that this is the main reason that people have a negative 
reaction wfoen they hear about social movements. People, she argues, do not like to be 
stirred out o f their status quo existence. McEdwards concludes that the agitators have 
found that powerful rhetoric is needed if they aim to achieve radical goals.
Maurice Char land (1993), m his essay “Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case o f the Peuple 
Québécois”, argues that although people may not like to listen to movements that argue 
for change fi’om the status quo, they are nonetheless shackled into listening. He explains 
that people are bound to listen if they are around near the speaker. This point seems 
especially true for political parties, such as the BJP, since without the subjects they would
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5have no audience to persuade. Thus, although audiences may dislike agitative rhetoric, 
the audiences are bound to listen to the agitator because the audience is in the right place 
at the right time.
Academic Literature on Hinduism and Indian Politics 
The first category that should be examined when studying a Hindu political party is 
literature that examines Hinduism as a religioiL Daniel Gold (1991) argues that Hindus 
have historically been aware o f themselves as many different groups and not as one unified 
community. When the British colonized and formed what they called India, they labeled 
the natives with words such as Sikh, Hindu, and Muslim. The British labeled these people 
because they feh that the natives shared some sort o f tradition that was based on religion 
(Gold, p. 536). The British actually created Hinduism out o f many diverse groups. This 
grouping together o f maty different groups to form Hinduism explains vdiy there are 
many different scriptures and texts within this religion, rather than one unified religious 
text.
The people Wx) have been labeled as Hindus do not share a unified vision of 
themselves. They usually describe themselves by their caste or community, not as Hindus 
(Narayanan, 1996). However, the rise o f Hindu nationalism in the form o f political parties 
is raising questions about the belief that Hindus will never see themselves as a group. 
Although Hindu nationalism is on the rise, any group, fi’om inside or outside, that attempts
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6to unify Hindus is going to foce an uphill battle because o f the lack o f a iy  one hofy book 
or prophet within Hmduism.
In studying the BJP, I have focused on artfoles and books that look at the BJP as a 
social or political movement. Not much o f importance was written on the BJP before 
1991, a year before the mosque in Ayodhya, India was razed. An excellent account o f the 
years before and the months after the razing o f the Ayodhya mosque exists in Creating A 
Nationality: The Ranyanmabhumi Movement and Fear o f the Self (Nandv. Trivedy, 
Mayaram, Yagnik, 1995). Nandy, et al explore the historical development o f the 
destruction o f the Ayodltya Mosque. The authors conclude that the government o f India 
spurred the destruction o f the mosque by inqilementing the Mandai Commission, a report 
that called for afBrmative action for Muslims and the untouchables within India. The BJP 
disliked the Mandai Commission, but it wanted to divert attention from the foct that it 
opposed a policy that was aimed at hewing lower caste Hindus. The BJP retaliated 
against the Indian government by marching to Ayodhya to protest the implementation of 
the Mandai Commission, but the BJP claimed that it was just attempting to unite Hindus 
against Muslims.
In 1990 the BJP was stopped from starting riots over the mosque. However, the 
Indian populace was not so lucky in 1992. Just as the Mandai commission resulted in lots 
o f agitation caused by the BJP, Narayanan (1996) investigated the causes for the change 
o f values in the BJP after the razing o f the mosque in 1992. He found that the BJP lost
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
many of hs more moderate votes Wien it attacked the mosque. The BJP, in response to 
the loss in popularity among the moderates, started changing its values and rhetoric to 
attendit to regain the lost votes. In essence, the BJP realized that to gam power it had to 
moderate hs views. In a similar article, Eric Kolodner (1995) described the losses that the 
BJP suffered after they destroyed the mosque and the resulting moderation that the BJP 
pursued so that h could reestablish itself as a party with influence in the country.
Ayoob (1997) examines the 1996 Indian National elections in which the BJP ruled for 
one week. The BJP could not form a working majority so h had to resigiL This article 
argues that the elections were a significant turning point for the BJP and that they are 
currently in a re-evaluation phase that will result in a decision that will affect all o f Indian 
politics. This soul searching could result m either a moderate or much more radical BJP.
Popular Literature
The final group o f literature comes fi’om newspapers and non-academic magazines. 
Again, just like the academic literature, not much was written in popular literature about 
the BJP before the 1990's.
Clarke (1993, June 12) explained that after the Ayodhya riots, the BJP became more 
and more radical in its rhetoric, while increasing in power. This radicalizing o f the BJP 
almost destroyed it because as the leaders were becoming more and more radical they 
were also losing maity o f their more moderate followers. Dalyrymple (1992, December 
13) also agrees with the view that the 1992 riots put the BJP in a very difiScuk situatioiL
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8Whfle maity o f the upperclass voters, the main supporters o f the BJP, supported the razing 
o f the mosque, m aty o f the lower classes felt alienated by the riots. This situation hurt the 
BJP because the party was attempting to get lower class support. Many o f the moderate 
BJP members distanced themselves from the group.
Ghosh (1993, September 18) examines the issue o f the BJP’s attempt to rule India and 
explains that shortfy after the destruction o f the Ayodhya mosque the BJP realized that it 
needed to focus on another issue. The issue that the BJP chose was the econonqr. Ghosh 
explains that the BJP leadership realized that without a solid economic policy it would 
never rule India. Sang (1995, May 25) also delves into the issue of the BJP and its 
attempt to create an economic policy. As these authors explain, by the spring o f 1995 the 
BJP was already creating hs new economic policy and accusing the government o f helping 
multinational companies at the expense o f hard working Indians. The electorate praised 
the BJP’s movement toward a formulation o f a socioeconomic policy. By the summer o f 
1995, (Graves 1995, August 9) the BJP organized non-violent protest groups throughout 
India, thus getting hs economic message out to the populace. Trying to bring forward the 
imagery o f a war on an economic battlefield, the BJP, “has identified h (Swadeshi) as the 
battle-cry for the polIs.”(Handoo, December 6,1995). This battle cry for their economic 
policy has become, “an economy o f the people, by the people, and for the people.” 
(Handoo, December 6,1995).
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9In 1995 politkians and reporters realized that the elections o f 1996 would be a battle 
between the BJP and the then ruling Congress Party, the party that Gandhi formed.
The general election next spring will be critical, a battle between those who 
adhere to the Nehruvian ideal and the Hindu nationalist movement, with its 
strong thread o f extremism and fonaticism, Wiich has risen to political strength 
by exploiting prejudice (Fishlock,1995).
Besides the issue o f secularism, Wiich the BJP attempted to avoid as much as possible 
because it was attempting to moderate its values, the 1996 elections tended to focus on 
corruption within Indian politics. Specifically, the BJP focused on the seemingfy 
irreversible corruption that was plaguing the Congress Party. Manjeet Kripalani and 
Nicole Harris investigate the issue o f corruption and how the BJP used it to win the 1996 
elections (1996, May 20). The BJP wielded the weapon o f corruption so well during the 
elections that it resulted in the replacement o f the former Prime Minister P. V. Narashimo 
Rao by Sitaram Kesri in the Indian Congress almost five months after the 1996 elections. 
The reason, as John Zubrycki explains, is that Rao was tainted by so much corruption 
before the 1996 elections (1997, January 6).
Most o f the literature that has been written since the 1996 elections focuses on the 
impending colkqsse o f the current ruling Indian coalition. This coalition was formed solely 
to stop the BJP fix>m calling new elections, not because any o f the parties are similar to 
one another. This coalition is composed o f 13 different parties ranging from fise m vket
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capitalists to communists ( Swanqr, December 18, 1996; The Morning Call f Allentown). 
June 7,1996; Xinhua New Agency. December 26, 1996).
METHODOLOGY 
In order to study the ever-changing group known as the BJP, I will use James 
Darseys’ catalytic events model (1991). As stated earlier, Darsey identifies catafytic 
events within movements and the rhetorical events that ensue. I will also borrow from 
Robert Fykenbergs’ religious fimdamentalism model in Wiich he identifies five issues that 
all fimdamentalist movements reflect in order to be successful In this thesis I use “the 
evil” from Frykenbergs’ model “The evil” is a  group or person that the movement 
focuses on and says must be destroyed.
“The evil” is almost always a danger from within a society. “Like a serpent, it is 
insidious and insinuating. Betrayal and deception lurk inside the shadows o f the best o f 
societies.”(Fr)Aenberg, 1994, p. 595). “The eviF’ is relevant when studying a religious 
social movement because o f the inherent desire o f religious groups to blame someone for 
anything that goes wrong. This is especialfy true o f Hindu groups (Frykenberg, 1994).
The methodology in this ptqier will include ident^ing catafytic events that have 
affected the BJP movement in India, the identification of the rhetorical eras created by the 
catalytic event, an examination o f “the evfl” in each Aetorical era, and the value appeals 
within the BJP during the different Aetorical eras. The catalytrc events are events in India
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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that resulted in changes in tte  values o f the BJP and in the overall power structure relatn^ 
to the BJP.
Many may ask Wiy a non-western group can be studied using two theories that have 
been formulated in the western world, there are three reason for this. First, as noted 
earlier in this paper, Hinduism is largefy a  creation o f the west. Therefore, a western 
model may be superior to a model that was created in India because the western model has 
possibly been created in the mindset o f Hinduism itself
Second, the BJP is pro-westem. While the BJP is anti-western in certain instances, 
such as what they label junk food culture. The BJP sees low level jobs, such as 
restaurants, as the junk food culture. On the other hand, the BJP is a very pro-westem 
when it comes to high technology and firms that it sees as helping India. This answers the 
problem that some people may have with studying a group that is perceived as overtly 
anti-western. The third and final reason that the BJP can be studied effectively with the 
theories that are in this thesis is because Frykenberg did much of work in South Asia.
This means that this theory was created in the culture that it is studying.
Era one begins with a catalytic event wiiich occurred on April 4,1980- the banning o f 
membership in the Janata coalition and the RSS at the same time- and continues until 1984 
with the humiliating defeat o f the BJP in elections. This era was a formation period in 
which the BJP embraced moderate views.
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Era two began in 1986 wfoen two catafytic events occurred. The & st event was lA en 
the Congress Party passed through Parliament the Muslim Women (Protection o f Rights 
On Divorce) Bill which followed traditional Islamic laws. The second event was the 
opening o f the Ayodhya Mosque, vdiich had been locked since 1970. This period ended in 
1990.
The third era began on August 7,1990 with the announcement by the ruling 
government that it would inqilement the Mandai Commission, a job reservation program. 
This period ended in 1992.
The fourth era began on December 6, 1992 with the demolition o f the Ayodhya 
Mosque and ends with the 1996 elections in which the BJP took power for 19 days. This 
period marked a return to moderation for the BJP m its attempt to gain power and is the 
completion o f the 16-year period for this case study.
It is hoped that this case study will lead to the identification o f unique insights in the 
development o f BJP rhetoric from 1980 to 1996. Hopefiilfy, this study will allow the 
examiner to draw conclusions about how the BJP Aetoric has changed over the past 16 
years.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2 
THE BJP IS BORN 
Period One 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Politics in India is unstable, but 1980 was trufy an unusual year even for India: The 
first non-Congress national government since partition in 1947 suffered a  huge defeat. 
Thus, the Congress Party was once again at the helm oflndia. In addition, the Bharatfya 
Jana Sangh part o f the Janata Party that had ruled India since 1977 broke away and 
formed a new political party called the Bharatfya Janata Party, or The Indian People’s 
Party, on April 5th, 1980 (Frykenberg, 1993). No one could foresee it at the time, but the 
BJP would be in the race to rule India by the end o f the 1980's.
In 1975 Indira Gandhi, daughter o f the late Jawaharlal Nehru and, at that time ruler o f 
India, called a national emergency after the Supreme Court oflndia invalidated her seat in 
Congress due to charges o f corruptioiL Gandhi ignored the Supreme Court ruling and 
called for a crack down on all political opponents. She placed all people that she believed 
were subversive under preventive detention. The result o f this crackdown was two years 
during which popularity o f Hindu nationalism increased. In 1977 Gandhi lifted the state o f 
national emergency and called new national elections. The elections resulted in the first
13
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non-Congress Party government. The coalition was composed o f many different parties 
with various ideologies, including the Bharatfya Jana Sangh, or the Jana Sangh as Aey 
were commonfy known. The Jana Sangh was a nationalist party that gained many o f its 
supporters because o f its Hindu nationalistic Aetoric. However, the main reason it was 
such an integral part o f the Janata Party was because o f its discipline and organization, 
traits which Ae other parties in the coalition lacked (Embree, 1994). Indian political 
groups are usualfy unorganized and undisciplined, but not the Jana Sangh. The Jana 
Sangh was disciplined because o f its afGliation wiA the Rashtrfya Swayamsevak Sangh, or 
Ae RSS. The RSS, lA ich still exists today, is a Hindu nationalist group that prides itself 
on its organization. Its supporters refer to its organization as looking like Ae boy scouts. 
Its critics liken the RSS organization to the Nazi Party o f Germany. The RSS has 
promised not to be a traditional political party, but this promise has not stopped it from 
supporting political parties. It has therefore become a quasi-political entity.
Unfortunately for the Jana Sangh and the Janata Party, the membership that most o f 
Ae Jana Sangh members had wiA the RSS became a contentious issue. This became an 
issue because o f the history o f the RSS. Before 1977, the RSS had been implicated in 
many bombings in India, and it was also alleged that Mahatma Gandhi’s assassin had been 
a member o f the RSS. Because o f actions such as these, any afSliations wiA the RSS 
were shunned by most citizens. This dual-membership controversy proved to be the end 
for Ae Janata coalition, which was so focused on party in-fighting that it could not focus
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on Ae elections during 1980. The result o f the dual-membership controversy was the 
victory o f Indira Gandhi (after the Supreme Court dropped the corruption charges) and 
her Congress Party.
On April 4th, 1980 the majority o f the Janata Party executive board voted to outlaw 
any member o f the party from working wiA a front organization. This action prevented 
aity member o f the Janata party from being a member ofboA  the Janata Party and the 
RSS (Ram Rejoins, 1980). The outlawing of dual membership in the Janata coalition and 
Ae RSS resulted in the formation o f the BJP on April 5th, 1980, by most o f Ae members 
o f Ae Jana Sangh, and the beginning o f an era for the newly formed BJP.
The birA o f the BJP received scant attention by the media. The reason for this lack of 
media attention was because its predecessor had never had much success at the polls, 
(except during the 1977 elections and only then when it formed a coalition wiA a diverse 
set o f political parties). One o f the reasons that the Jana Sangh had not had much success 
was its fonatical use o f Hindu nationalistic rhetoric lAich only motivated a specific group 
o f Indians. When the BJP was formed, hs leaders conscious^ decided to moderate its 
rhetoric and values in an attempt to get more votes and appear as a viable akemative to 
Ae moderate Congress Party (Frykenberg, 1993). One exanq>le is the creation o f the BJP 
flag, Miich had the color green lA ich is associated whh Islam
Following the creation o f the BJP, the leaders o f the newly formed BJP fob betrayed 
by Aeir former colleagues in the moderate Janata Dal coalhioiL The leaders had joined
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Ae Janata Party in an attempt to gain power so they could force their views on Ae 
populace. However, the leaders o f the Jana Sangh soon discovered that, when they joined 
Ae Janata government, thty had to give up their mdividuality and autonomy. When Ae 
BJP was formed, the leaders vowed never to give up their autonomy again (Auerbach, 
December 28, 1981).
THE EVIL
The BJP coalesced in an attendit to destroy Ae evil, which was Ae Congress party. 
Everything that the BJP did was an attempt to vanquish the Congress Party from office. 
Corruption and danger and pollution come from outside, from out 
Aere, in the world. That is expected. But there is often a danger more 
deadfy. It comes from within. Like a serpent, it is insidious and 
insinuating. Betrayal and deception lurk inside the shadows o f the best 
o f societies (Frykenberg, 1994, p. 595).
The BJP saw the Congress party as evil because it was extremefy corrupt, especially 
since Ae time Indira Gandhi declared a national emergency. When speaking about Ae 
Congress party in this era, the BJP used words such as “betrayal and exploitation”. The 
Congress Party was also seen as the protector o f secularism, viiich the BJP saw as 
undemocratic because it saw this as an attenqxt to avoid the majority’s values. In the 
BJP’s eyes Aere was no need to protect a minority through law. The minority should 
accept Ae rule o f the majority.
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VALUE APPEALS 
Unity through individually in the BJP is the value appeal in this rhetorical period. 
The BJP leaders felt that they had been betrayed by the Congress Party, but they also felt 
that they had been betrayed by the members o f the Janata Coalition. This sense o f betrayal 
meant that, even though the BJP was opposed to the Congress Party, it was also opposed 
to the other political parties. The BJP was in its formation phase, A ^ch meant that it 
must stay unified or risk assimilation ty  another political party.
The unity o f the BJP was given its first test at the end o f 1981 and the beginning o f 
1982, when various political parties started forming a coalition to align against the 
Congress Party. The coalition desperately needed the support o f the BJP, because it was 
perceived as having the support o f militant, middle-class Hindus, a large voting bloc. 
Contrary to the hopes o f the coalition, the BJP declined to join the coalition because o f its 
past experience with the Janata coalitiotL The coalition was unable to win the fight 
against the Congress Party, p e d i^  because o f the lack o f BJP support (The Economist. 
December 19,1981). However, the ability to avoid joining a  coalition was a  key moral 
victory for the BJP, Wtich had been unsure o f its political ability to remain unified. The 
other opposition parties in India once again asked the BJP to join a coalition in 198Vbuf 
L.K. Advani, the Secretary General o f the BJP, quick to show that the BJP was unified, 
said ‘There is no question o f a fusion o f identities” (April 25, 1982).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18
Besides attempting to unify itself the BJP was also attenqning to unify Indians against 
the Congress Party and, to a lesser extent, the other political parties. One o f the ways that 
the BJP attenqned to unify India was by accusmg the Congress Party o f corruption. In 
1984 the BJP formalized these chafes by issuing a manifesto against the Congress Party 
that accused it o f institutionalizing corruption within India (O'Neill, November 30, 1984).
In 1981, the Indian government reported that India had produced a record wheat 
crop, but it then stated that India had to inqwrt graiiL The BJP used this statement to its 
own benefit in an attendit to unite Indians agamst the Congress Party. The BJP called for 
the resignation o f the Union Food Minister and then proceed to call the Congress Part}' 
treacherous and a threat to the nation (India Imports, Jufy 10, 1981).
The BJP also capitalized on the perception that Gandhi was becoming less and less 
democratic. In 1984, Gandhi dismissed the chief minister o f the state o f Jammu and 
Kashmir (Williams, Jufy 11,1984). This dismissal resulted in the BJP joining other groups 
to show its support for democracy and unity. The BJP and its allies sharpfy criticized 
Gandhi for her use o f police powers instead o f calling for new elections in the state.
The BJP went one step further than just calling for unity against the Congress Party. It 
called for unity against the United States and international pressure to open its economy. 
The call was for self-reliance. In 1982, the Congress Party succumbed to United States’ 
wishes and desist reprocessing nuclear fuel. The BJP accused the government of bowing 
down to the United States and called for Indians to unite against the United States. In the
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same year Atal Behari Vajpayee, the president o f the BJP, accused the Indian government 
o f accepting conditions on loans from the International Monetary Fund. The BJP 
attenqned to force the Indian government into either giving back the m ony or refiising 
the conditions.
Moderation was the second value appeal that the BJP used durmg this rhetorical 
period. The BJP leaders thought that the reason the Jana Sangh had never been very 
prominent (except in coalitions) was because o f its radical stance toward Muslims and 
other non-Hindus. The Jana Sangh had taken the stance that the Indian nation should 
consist o f only Hindus, or at least that non-Hindus should accept Hindu rule. On the other 
hand, the Congress Party had always been in frtvor o f a  secular state and had stayed in 
power because o f its moderate views. The Congress Party had always tried to protect all 
religions and minorities. The BJP immedmtefy set to preserve some o f the broader base of 
support that the Jana Sangh had known while it was part o f the moderate Janata coalition. 
The result was an ironic reversal o f roles between the BJP, heir to the radical Jana Sangh, 
and the Congress Party, the party tradhionalfy that protected minority rights.
The BJP made Vajpayee its president, because o f his history o f moderation. During 
the ruling period o f the Janata government, Vajpayee had been the foreign minister and 
had dealings with Pakistan, the most populous Muslim State in the world. Vajpayee was 
able to create constructive relations between India and Pakistan and the BJP hoped that he 
would be able to lure Muslims and other minorities to the BJP. The BJP also appointed
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Sikhanda Bakfat, a  Muslim, as one o f hs general secretaries in an attempt to appear 
moderate (Gold, 1991),
The BJP did more to appeal to moderates than just appoint moderate leaders. The 
BJP went so friras to make sure that the symbols associated with the BJP were seen as 
moderate. The first symbol that the BJP changed was its p ary  flag. The Jana Sangh flag 
was saffron, a flag associated with Hindu nationalism (Gold, 1991). The newly created 
BJP flag was saffron and green. The green was extremefy important because it is a color 
associated with Islam. The flag was meant to symbolize the unification of Hindus and 
Muslims. The BJP also made the lotus, an Indian symbol, its ofBcial symbol The BJP, 
once again, was attempting to appeal to the non-Hindus.
The BJP was, in essence, striving to become the pary  that was truly the Indian’s 
People Pary. At the same time, Gandhi and the Cot%ress P ary  were becoming more and 
more embroiled in the separatist troubles o f India. Therefr)re, the Congress Pary  and the 
BJP had almost completed an ironic reversal o f roles. Gandhi who started playing the 
Hindu card by speaking about Hindu hegemony over all o f the other people o f India 
(Fykenberg, 1993). She raised Muslim fears in all o f India and turned a deaf ear to Sikh 
pleas for mercy and democracy when they were feced against the Indian army.
The BJP thought that its appeal for moderation would pay off but it resulted in the 
defeat o f the BJP in the 1984 elections. Almost all o f the RSS supporters left the ranks o f
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the BJP, because o f its apparent abandonment o f Hindu nationalism, and voted for their
supposed^ secular opponents.
The intensification o f the religiopolitical crisis during Indira Gandhi’s 
administration, in part the result o f some o f her policies, dealt heavy blows to 
the structural stability o f India’s political system. The government’s anxiety to 
win Hindu support, coupled with hs fiiHure to satisfy Sikh demands for 
autonomy, even m a limhed way, resuhed in turmoil and an increase m 
terrorism. This in turn led to the strengthening o f radical frictions within Sikh 
as well as Hindu fimdamentalism. The Operation Blue Star storming o f the 
Golden Tenq)le at Amritsar on 5 June 1984, for example, led to a spiral o f 
retaliatory violence in which the prime minister herself was assassinated by two 
Sikh bodyguards (31 October), and over three thousand Delhi Sikhs were in 
turn massacred at the hands o f Congress supporters and Hindu nationalists.
The parliamentary elections held in the afiermath o f these events commu 
nalized the issue o f national unity; a blatant form o f competitive communalism 
between major parties and a fragrant e}q)loitation o f communal vote banks 
contributed to Rajiv Gandhi’s landslide victory a few weeks later. The 
Congress party had effectivefy co-opted BJP issues and had encroached upon 
BJP constituencies. Congress even won support fix)m RSS leaders who were 
worried about ways to check India’s disintegration (Frj^enberg, 1993, p. 245).
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Why did the BJP’s ^ jpeal o f moderate values friil? Many people within India associated 
the BJP with the RSS (^iiich had been accused o f assassinating Mahatma Gandhi), and 
the Jana Sangh ( v ^ h  had been part o f a  an unstable Janata government). The Congress 
Party, on the other hand, was associated with Mahatma Ghandi, who had been a great 
hero for India and society as a w ^ le . While the people o f India saw that the Congress 
Party had been accused o f corruption, people tended to fevor the stability o f the Congress 
Party over the unknown BJP.
The BJP also lost the most important people within its organization: the RSS.
Although not all RSS members were members o f the BJP, they had traditionally supported 
nationalist organizations that espoused Hindu hegemony. Once the BJP started 
moderating its rhetoric, it forgot about the RSS. The Congress Party did not forget about 
the RSS, and Gandhi embarked on a campaign to generate a wave o f Ifindu nationalism 
behind her party (Claiborne, August 27,1983). The Congress Party quickfy became the 
defender o f Hindu rights. It counted on the foct that most people would not believe the 
BJP truly believed in rights for non-Hindus. The reason that the Congress Party felt that 
Hindus would believe it was because the Congress Party could actually bnplemeat 
legislation and laws to protect Hindus in order to show its sincerity. Gandhi spumed the 
Muslims by passing up the opportunity to link Congress with foe Moslem National 
Conference Party, all in the name o f pursuing the Hindu vote. However, since foe BJP
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was a smaller pary, it did not have the votes or voice to show that it was sincere about 
protecting minorities.
In 1983 the Congress P ary  started rumors o f meeting with RSS leaders in secret.
These rumors incensed the BJP leaders, especialfy when the RSS leaders never denied the 
meetings. The Congress P ary  made a grab for the Hindu votes in northern India, ^ c h  is 
a key area o f votes.
However, even in 1983 people knew that Hindu nationalism could get out o f control if 
not quickly stopped. ‘The danger o f creating a wave o f strong Hindu nationalist 
sentiment in northern India...is that Gandhi could lose control o f the movement and it 
could grow to challenge the authoriy o f Congress.” (Claiborne, August 27,1983).
Gandhi and the rest o f the Congress P ary  had trufy unleashed a movement that would 
prove to threaten the secular democracy that had made up India since its partition in 1947. 
By getting the Hindu vote in 1984, Gandhi won a short term victory without thinking 
about the long term effect that the division o f Hindus and Muslim would have on India.
Little did the BJP or the other political partks realize in 1984, but the BJP’s electoral 
fortunes would start to change in 1986.1986 would mark the unleashing o f the BJP as a 
nationalist force. It would quickfy shed hs image as a moderate pary  for all Indians and h 
would join forces with the RSS and the VHP, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (The World 
Hindu Sociey). This would result in the^  emergence o f the BJP as the champion for Hindu 
rights.
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CHAPTERS 
THE BJP RETURNS TO ITS RADICAL ROOTS 
Period Two 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
At the onset o f the second period, spanning from 1986 to 1990, the BJP rose in power 
by capturing the Hindu votes that the Congress Party had previously gotteiL In the 
beginning of 1986, the Congress Party committed two acts that are the catafytic events for 
this period.
In 1978, the Muslim Ahmed Shah divorced his wife o f forty four years, Shah Bano.
He then returned her dowry, as was required by Muslim community law. Shah Bano sued 
for maintenance and was awarded a sum of rupees per month, to be paid by Ahmed Shab. 
Shab appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the maintenance violated Muslim 
community law, in which the wife’s femify was supposed to support her. The Supreme 
Court, at the end o f 1986, decided that Shah Bano should be awarded maintenance and 
that she had not been awarded enough, so the court increased the amount to be paid 
(Frykenberg, 1993).
The result o f the ruling was a significant protest by Muslims, argued that the
Hindu majority was taking away their rights. At issue was a fundamental conflict between
24
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procedural and substantive law. When India was created by the British, each communities 
customs and laws were to be respected as long as peace was not endangered (Fr^dcenberg, 
1993).
The ruling was tied to the Congress Party, because, m India, the ruling party can 
invalidate a court decision if the party does not like the ruling. At first, Rajiv Gandhi 
supported the Court ruling and announced that all divorced women should get alimony. 
Political realiy soon set in for Gandhi. The Supreme Court ruling was seen “as a threat to 
Islam and to the identiy o f the Muslims m India” (Embree, 1990, p. 100). Gandhi and the 
Congress Pary  still depended on the Muslim vote, so Gandhi responded to this mistrust 
by forcing the Muslim Women (Protection o f Rights On Divorce) Bill through a reluctant 
Parliament. This bill preserved the Muslim Personal law that orthodox Muslims alleged 
the Supreme court had invalidated. The bill barefy passed through Parliament on May 5, 
1986 (Rudolph, 1988). The result invalidated the Shah Bano court decision.
In December o f 1985 the Congress P ary  lost as an election. Then in February o f 1986 
the Congress Pary saw that its popularly ratings filling in the polls. Congress P ary  
members reasoned that ratings were falling because o f the Shah Bano issue. The pary  had 
foiled to act quickly enough to recover the Muslim votes after the Shah Bano debacle.
The Congress, ly  February 1986, was working to remedy this problem by attempting to 
pass the Muslim Women Rights B ill The Congress Pary  did not realize what a disaster 
this bill would pose for its attenqn to get the Hindu vote. The Congress Pary  alienated
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the Hindu voters when it pushed the bill through Congress. The Cot%ress Party then 
made a serious error m the way that it attenqned to placate the Hmdu voters Wien it 
opened up the BaM  Masjid.
In February o f 1986 the Congress Party allowed the Babri Mosque, a  Muslim Mosque 
in Ayodhya that had been locked since 1970, to be reopened. This mosque is important to 
Hindus, who believe that the Mosque is on the she where Rama, a Hmdu God and Hero, 
had been bom and Wiere a ten^le had been buik to honor him. Hindus believe that 
Babur, the first o f the Mughal emperors, singled out and destroyed the mosque to 
celebrate the victory o f Islam over the Hindus.
In 1949 idols o f Rama appeared, or were placed, in the Babri Mosque. Hindus 
claimed that the idols were a divine action by Ram Wiile Muslims claimed that Hindu 
revivalists had entered the mosque and set up the idols to defile the hofy place. Soon after 
the idols appeared Muslims and Hindus clashed. The animosity between the two groups 
quickly reached the boiling point and in 1970 the local magistrate ordered the doors o f the 
mosque, or tenqjle, to be locked until the issue was settled (Embree, 1990).
On February 14, 1986, a state judge ruled that Hindus could use the building as a 
temple until the issue was resolved. This action did not preclude Muslims from also using 
the building as a mosque (Van Der Veer, 1994). The ruling meant that, fi)r a certain 
number o f days each year, Hindus could enter the Muslim mosque, but, for the rest o f the 
year, it could onfy be used ty  Muslims. The Congress Party saw this situation as the
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vehicle to assuage the growmg unease due to the focus on the Shah Bano affoir. This 
attempt to appease both Muslims and Hindus backfired on the Congress Party, and helped 
the BJP.
Two days after the court decision, Muslhns and Hindus took to the streets to protest 
the ruling. Neither side was happy with the decision. Syed Shahabuddm, a Muslim 
member o f Parliament, said “For a Muslim, nothing could be more shocking, more 
insulting, than the sign o f idol worship inside o f a mosque.” (Tempest, April 13, 1986). 
Hindus and the BJP members were a little happier than the Muslims. However, the BJP 
still wanted the mosque to be replaced with a temple.
The influx o f Muslims and Hindus into Ayodhya brought the city to the boiling point. 
On either the 13th or 14th o f February, the riots started in Ayodhya. No one knows who 
started the riots, but the Hindus and Muslims struck at each other with a vengeance. The 
violence soon spread throughout India. The government stood paralyzed and horrified by 
the result o f its ruling. On March 7th, the Congress Party finalfy retaliated against the 
violence. Prime Minister Gandhi ordered the dismissal o f Chief Minister G.M. Shah and 
ordered Governor’s rule, which is the dismissal o f the state government and the inqwsition 
o f central government control, in Utter Pradesh, the state where Ayodhya is located.
Gandhi soon placed a  curfew on many Muslim neighborhoods in India and banned all 
religious rallies and meetings. Gandhi once again was attempting to get Hindu votes by
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not placing curfews on Hindu neighbofooods, but the BJP was alreatfy reforming its 
strategy and values to reach the Hindu voters.
As the riots over the Babri mosque subsided, the Congress Party finalfy got the 
Muslim Women Rights Bill through Parliament. But the bill did not have the effect that 
the Congress Party had envisioned. Mary Muslims felt that the Congress Party had 
abandoned them when it allowed the jnftial Shah Bano court decision. Muslims were not 
about to be fooled by a Congress Party that was onfy looking for votes and not for the 
best interest of its constituents. The Congress Party had been trying to increase its votes 
with Muslims and Hindus, but in the end, the party alienated both Hindus and Muslims. 
This blunder resulted in a wave o f Hindu nationalism. Kndus began searching for a party 
that would represent their interests.
The BJP had been looking for a new strategy and new values to support ever since its 
humiliating defeat in the 1984 elections. The BJP had seen how the Congress Party had 
won the 1984 elections, and it realized that Hindu voters had been the key votes. The BJP 
also saw how badfy the Congress was managing the Shah Bano and Ayodhya issues by 
attempting to please everyone. Wide in the end not making aiyone happy. The BJP 
started to reformulate hs values and strategies around Hindu nationalism, its roots that h 
had discarded in 1980 in the hope o f winning through moderation. The resuk was the 
emergence of a powefoouse that would end up challenging the Congress Party for national 
power.
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After the riots, as an anoiymous Hindu reveler declared, “We are 700 million strong” 
(Tempest, April 13,1986). The mqx>rtance o f this statement was the implicit declaration 
o f the coming wave o f Hinduism as an identity within India.
Rajiv Gandhi, even as earfy as May, realized the strategic eitors that he had made in 
the Shah Bano and Ayodhya afifoirs, and attenqned to draw attention away from them by 
ordering attacks on Sikh nationalists, similar to the ones that his mother had made before 
her assassination. The attacks had a different effect than the one that Gandhi had desired. 
The attack drew attention to the foct that Gandhi was becoming increasingfy desperate and 
authoritarian (Los Angeles Times. May 1, 1996). Not only did it draw attention to 
Gandhi’s desperation, but it almost resulted in his assassination by Sikh nationalists in 
October o f 1986 (Pain, October 5,1986).
Concurrently, as the Congress’ political capital base was trickling away, the BJP was 
finishing its internal reconstruction. The BJP hoped that this internal reconstruction would 
be able to push the Congress Party out o f power. The BJP strategically put together its 
“Free Rama” platform, in which it demanded that the Ayodhya mosque be demolished and 
replaced with a tenq)le to worship Rama.
The first thing the BJP did to reformulate its stance around this value was to have Atal 
Behari Vajptyee step down as president o f the BJP, so that Lai Krishna Adwmi could take 
over as president. Vxgpayee had been elected as president o f the BJP because o f his 
modermion. However, Wien the BJP decided that it wanted to reestsdsiish its Hindu
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nationalist roots, it knew that it needed a passionate leader. L JC. Advani was certainfy the 
leader that the BJP had been looking for because o f his passfon for politics. His first 
action was to reestablish the links between the BJP, RSS, and VHP. By reestablishing 
these ties, the BJP once again became the party for Hindus. Advani intertwined the BJP 
with the Ayodhya issue, and essentialfy declared that the BJP would win or lose elections 
based on this issue.
The BJP had its first success with this strategy in June o f 1987. When the BJP and the 
Lok Dal, another political party, joined together to win as an election in Haryana, a state 
where a Congress Party politician had been in power (“Opposition anti-Gandhi”, July 2, 
1987). Advani used this victory as the ralfying point to call Hindus to throw Gandhi out 
o f power. The election results were a serious setback for the Congress Party, because 
Haryana was in the core o f the “Hindi heartland” Wiich had kept the Congress Party in 
power for almost 40 years. However, maty in India believed that the Congress Party 
could stage a comeback. T  don’t think this will be the end o f Gandhi, but it’ll be a major 
setback that will make him more vulnerable to pressures fit>m the (conservative) party 
members or dissidents.” (Tenorio, June 19,1987).
After the Haryana election, the Congress Party lost two more state elections and the 
BJP kept rising in power. The Congress Party was experiencing a crisis like none it had 
ever seen before. The Congress Party could not do anything right. From 1987 to 1989,
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India experienced even more riots over the Ayodlya issue and the Cot%ress Party leaders 
could not solve the problem.
From as an electoral standpoint, 1989 proved to be the worst year for the Congress 
Party and the best year for the BJP. The BJP was declared India’s fostest growing 
political party, viiHe the Congress P ary  seemed to be fightmg for political survival (Coll, 
November 5,1989). The National Front, a  coalition formed in 1988 which attempted to 
resurrect the Janata Dal coalition o f 1977-1980, was requesting that the BJP to join them 
as as an official member o f the National Front. The BJP, however, turned down the 
National Front it smart and declared that the elections, when the BJP had joined with the 
National Front, would be the last time that it would polMcalfy align with another pary, 
especially one that had members who were Communists. The Congress Pary  also 
approached the BJP in early 1989 to offer a political coalition, but the BJP outright 
rejected this offer.
By the foil o f 1989 it became clear to the National Front that it needed the BJP votes. 
When the BJP folly realized that the National Front needed its votes, it increased its 
demand that the Ayodhya Mosque be demolished and that a ten^le be built on the spot. 
The BJP and VHP created a  strategy that called for ramshila (bricks o f Lord Ram). This 
procession called for each village and town in India to bring a brick to Ayodhya to build a 
temple in place o f the Babri Masjid mosque (Van Der Veer, 1992). Gandhi immediately 
attempted to junq> on the bandwagon and even laid a stone next to the Babri Magid. This
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feeble attenqn did not help. Actually it helped the BJP, because it gave even more 
legitimacy to their crusade m Ayodhya.
The laying o f the foundation stones m Ayodhya immediately started riots in towns all 
over India. Bhagafyur and Bihar, towns in northern India, had most o f their Muslim 
populations wiped out. How the riots started is questionable. The Muslims said the 
Hindus were shouting blasphemous slogans at them. The Hindus said the Muslims began 
throwing stones and acid bombs at them without any provocation. “Before, we [Muslims 
and Hindus] were just like a femtfy,” said one Muslim fether whose son had been killed in 
the riots (Coll, September 23,1989). Many people in India realized that the riots were 
planned political events designed to gain votes. “This is going to happen more frequently 
before the elections...I think these kinds o f incidents are well-orchestrated, well-organized 
and planned on either side..Both groups do it.” (Coll, September 23, 1989).
By November, riots had spread throughout India, but curiousfy they had not occurred 
in Ayodhya. The police in Ayodhya were preparing by putting up barricades around the 
mosque. Throughout Ayodhya soldiers and police erected barricades (Coll, November 5,
1989). The VHP and the BJP, ly  November, had backed away from the promise to 
demolish the mosque, and had instead pledged to conduct a peaceful foundation-laying 
ceremony next to the mosque. This change was the result o f pressure from the Congress 
Party, which had threatened the BJP. The BJP felt that, if riots ensued in Ayodhya, then 
the populace, most notabfy Muslims, would punish the BJP and vote for the Congress
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Party (Teffr, November 9,1989). The BJP knew that Muslims were angry at Gandhi for 
wooing Hindu votes, because they fek that Gandhi had abandoned them. The BJP also 
realized that it would probably not get m aty Muslhns to vote for h, but, if  the BJP scared 
the Muslim population ly  creating riots, there was a possibility that Muslims would vote 
for the historicaify ekctoralfy strong Congress Party (Bajpai, November 12,1989). 
Gandhi’s decisions to attendit to get Hindu votes had made Muslims feel like the country 
had been thrown “back into the age o f barbarism just for the sake o f its political gains and 
out o f sheer ineptness.” (Bajpai, November 12). The BJP gambled that in areas where the 
electoral battle was mainly between the BJP and the Congress Party, Muslims would 
choose to vote for a third candidate. The BJP won the battle. The BJP, which had only 
won 2 out o f545 seats in India’s Lok Sabha, won 85 seats in 1989. This may not seem 
like many seats, but India has many political parties which divide the Parliament up into 
smaller pieces (Kolodner, 1995).
The BJP was the onfy party celebrating the results o f the elections because it proved to 
be a potent political force. The elections were indecisive because no party was able to 
form a majority government. The BJP held the block o f votes that the Congress Party and 
the National Front needed to achieve a majority so that a  coalition government could be 
formed. Vajpayee dashed any hopes that the Congress Party had o f getting the BJP votes. 
“We have fought the election against them. Now, how could we join hands with them?’ 
(Kelliher, November 27,1989).
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The National Front quickly approached the BJP and asked it to jom  the coalMoiL The 
BJP placed demands on the National Front that it knew would not be met. Two o f these 
demands were especially outrageous: I) that constitutional safeguards for India’s 100 
million Muslims be scrapped and 2) that Didia be turned mto a secular state. At first, 
many politicians in the National Front demanded that the leaders withdraw the offer to the 
BJP. The leaders refused to do this because they realized that “The people o f India want a 
non-Congress government to replace the corrupt and inefScient Congress government.” 
(Bajpai, November 28, 1989). I f  new elections were called, the National Front leaders 
feared they would lose their votes, possibly some o f them to the BJP.
By the middle o f December the BJP had agreed to join the coalition, without the 
National Front conceding on many o f the BJP demands. The BJP also did not give in to 
the demand o f the National Front for the BJP to give up its autonony. This coalition 
marked the beginning o f as an uneasy alliance (Madhavan, December 17, 1989). The 
survival o f the minority National Front government, headed by V.P. Singh, was dependent 
on its ability to placate the BJP on Muslim rights and the Ayodhya issue. The National 
Front felt that it could please the BJP rather easify because one o f the BJP’s goals was to 
keep the Congress Party out o f power and the BJP knew that support o f the National 
Front was crucial to do this.
Although the National Front had thought it would be easy to keep the BJP in line, it 
found this task anything but easy. Less than two months after V.P. Singh had been in
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office, cracks began to form in the coalitioiL Soon after he had taken the reigns o f power, 
V.P. Singh appointed a Muslim as the new Home \foiister. This was a bold choice since 
the BJP had complained that Gandhi had given too much power to Muslims. Shortly after 
the appomtment, the Home Nfinister’s daughter was kidnaped ty  Kashmiri separatists. 
These separatists demanded the release o f five promment members o f their organization 
who were in jafl.
The BJP wanted the government to retaliate with arms and crush the rebels. VJ*. 
Singh soon gave in to  the demands o f the rebels, creating a rift between the BJP and the 
rest o f the ruling coalition (Allen-NfiUs, January 20,1990). This capitulation gave rise to 
more violence in Kashmir, which spurred the BJP into demanding military action. Smgh, 
feeling that his ruling coalition was unraveling, gave into the BJP and sent the military 
into Kashmir to crack down on the rebels. Singh could have ordered the military to use 
tear-gas or rubber bullets, but instead the security forces opened fire with live ammunition 
on the unarmed crowds. The BJP leaders further escalated the tension in Kashmir by 
warning that India would go to war to protect Kashmir. Kashmir became calm after the 
security forces arrived, but Singh had created a rift with the leftist Action in his coalition 
by allying himself with the BJP on the Kashmir issue.
The end o f February and the beginning o f March marked further political jockeying in 
the National Front coalition because state elections were taking place. The elections were 
also proclaimed as the watershed that would decide the death or resurgence o f the
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Congress Party. Elections were taking place in eight o f states in \ ^ c h  the Congress held 
power. Singh had claimed, since the BJP joined his coahtfon that it would moderate on 
issues such as Ayodlya. However, the BJP had claimed that, if its power increased 
dramatically in the state elections, it would demand more power in the coalition (Anxieties 
in India, February 26,1990). This is the main reason the BJP did not run with the rest of 
the coalition in the state elections.
The state elections resulted in the further demoralization o f the Congress Party, which 
only retained power in two o f the eight states. The results o f these elections raised 
questions about the ability o f the Congress Part}' to remain a serious party in India. The 
Janata Dal secured outright power in one state and formed coalitions in three other states. 
One of the major coalition parties was the BJP. The BJP secured a majority in two states 
and formed a coalition with the Janata Dal in three other states. The results o f the state 
elections made ruling the National Front coalition harder for Singh because o f his reliance 
on a strong BJP which hated many o f the leftist parties in the coalition (Hindu Danger for 
India, March 7, 1990).
The Pakistani-Kashmir issue soon appeared again after the elections in India. Talk o f 
war between India and Pakistan continued to escalate, fonned by the newly found 
confidence within the BJP. Singh was manipulated ly  the BJP, which threatened to 
withdraw support from the coalition unless Singh kept a hard line on the Kashmir issue.
The BJP’s national executive demanded “hot pursuit” o f rebels in Kashmir. Soon after the
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national executive called for the chasing down o f rebels, signs began appearing with the 
BJP lotus symbol on them demanding to “Save Hindus from slaughter in Kashmir.” 
(Thomas, April 14,1990). These events coincuied with the introduction o f  a defense 
budget, in which the BJP succeeded in pushing the National Front to call for increased 
spending.
The beginning o f summer mariced forther escalation in the dispute. Advani called for 
the government to crack down and repress Kashmir further. He also called on the 
government to build nuclear weapons. “We believe India should acquire a nuclear 
deterrent. Nuclear power gives you leverage in diplomatic relations.” (Tarrant, June 1,
1990). This huge escalation within the crisis resulted in the United States becoming 
involved to help defuse the problem. While no settlement was agreed upon, the possibility 
o f war diminished considerabfy.
Soon after the Kashmir crisis had settled down on July 13, 1990, a political crisis 
erupted within the ranks o f the Janata Dal portion o f the National Front CoalitioiL Late 
on July 13th, three o f Singh’s senior cabinet members resigned shortfy after a 
controvorsial reiqipointment in the state o f Haryana. OB. Chautala was reinstated as the 
head o f the Haryana State Government two months after he had resigned, because he had 
been charged wilk inciting electoral violence and vote rigging. Singh denied that he had 
been mformed before Chautala was reinstated. Shortfy after the reappointment, observers 
showed them disillusionment with Singh, wiio had been voted to power on the platform of
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promoting “value-based politics.” (India: Government, Jufy 14,1990). On July 14th, 
Singh offered his resignation to the Presulent o f the Janata Dal, but the President rejected 
his resignation on the grounds that Singh would probably be able to keep the coalition 
together. By the beginning o f August the coalition looked as if it were going to survive, 
but then on August 7th Singh announced the inq>lementation o f the Mandai Commission 
Wiich called for the reservation o f civic jobs for the lower castes and other minorities.
This marked the beginning o f the end o f the National Front coalition.
THE EVIL
The BJP made it clear Wio it considered its primary eneny in this rhetorical period:
The Congress Party. The BJP had seen how easify the Congress Party had co-opted its 
votes in 1984 and swore that it would not h^ipen %ain. The BJP quickfy rallied to take 
back the Hindu votes that it had lost in 1984. The BJP also made it perfectfy clear that 
there was no way that it would alfy itself with the Congress Pary  in the 1989 elections. 
This hatred o f the Congress Pary  overrode the BJP’s desire for power when the Congress 
P ary  approached the BJP and offered as an alliance in 1989. “We have fought the 
election against them. Now, how could we join hands with them?” Asked Vajpayee, a 
former ruler o f the BJP (Kelliher, November 27,1989).
The BJP also resented the Congress Pary because o f its use o f power to reserve jobs 
for minorities. The BJP saw this action as as an a tte n d  to win votes among minorities in 
India. The BJP attacked the Congress Pary in this rhetorical period for being
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hypocritical. The BJP felt that the Congress Party was hypocritical because it attempted 
to get votes from the Muslim section o f the population vfoen it needed votes, but the rest 
o f the time the Congress Party argued that it was a party that protected Hindus.
VALUE APPEALS 
The BJP quickfy regrouped from its humiliating defeat in the 1984 elections and 
returned to its Hindu roots, discarding the attempt to moderate and get Muslim and Hindu 
votes. Positive Secularism is the most prominent value appeal in this period. Positive 
Secularism is in safeguarding minoriy rights while giving Hindus their rightful place in a 
county where they conqx)se 80 percent o f the populatioiL The BJP believed that Hindus 
should be able to decide everything and that the Muslims should let the Hindu majoriy 
rule India (Tefit, December 19,1989). Advani claims that Hindus are as an oppressed 
majoriy that cannot speak its mmd “There’s a curious secularism in this county. A 
Christian saying he is proud o f his religion is a  good thing, A Muslim saying he is proud o f 
Islam is a good thing, but Advani saying he is proud to be a Hindu is communalism.”
(Tefit, December 19,1989). Positive Secularism was quickfy labeled as communal and 
racist by almost all other political parties. While the BJP claimed that it would safeguard 
minoriy rights, it never said how it would do if it stuck to its 1989 election manifesto 
which sought to scrap all constitutional safeguards for Muslims.
The closer the 1989 elections came, the more the BJP called for a Hindu state in which 
all Muslims would give up their constitutional rights. This call was also one o f the main
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reasons that the BJP inarched to the Ayodhya Mosque in 1989 and 1990. The inarches 
were a reaction to policies that the government had m^lemented to help Muslims and the 
lower Hindu castes. Protecting the downtrodden was seen as divkiing the Hindu identity.
The second most prominent value appeal in this period was militarization. The BJP’s 
solution to most communal problems in India was to repress the problem group with 
weapons. In 1987, some prominent BJP leaders were killed by Sikh separatists. BJP 
followers began rioth^ across India and burning Sikh homes, temples and shops. The BJP 
leaders called for military rule in Punjab, the home o f the Sikh separatists (Lingam, July 
10,1987). The BJP held rallies at which they chanted “Death to Rajiv GandhT, because 
o f his M ure to stop the Sikh attacks (Lingam, July 31, 1987).
By 1988, the Sikh problem had gotten worse and the BJP was calling on Gandhi and 
the Congress Party to deploy the army to “quash” the Sikh rebels. Strikes were organized 
by the BJP to show the Congress Party that it wanted a  solution to the Sikh crisis. The 
government sent troops in periodically, but no permanent solution was found during this 
period.
Kashmir flared up after the BJP joined the National Front coalition and the issue 
created a controvery in the coalition. The National Front attempted to solve the problem 
through diplomacy at first, but then a top minister’s daughter was kidnaped ty  Kashmir 
rebels. After Singh gave into the demands o f the rebels, the BJP started pressuring the
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Singh government to take military action agamst the rebels and Pakistan, which the BJP 
claimed was supporting the rebels with weapons.
Singh soon accepted many o f the demands o f the BJP, which could at any time topple 
his government, and sent troops to Kashmir to crush the rebels. This crisis escalated out 
o f control for two months, all the lAAHe the BJP was calling for increased military spending 
to help in the “war against Kasmiri rebels” and demanding that the government “save 
Hindus from slaughter in Kashmir” (Thomas, April 14, 1990). This militarization o f the 
BJP broadened to include the Ayodhya issue when the Singh administration announced the 
implementation o f the Mandai Commission.
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CHAPTER 4
RADICALIZATION CONTINUES: RAM RAJYA AND HINDUTVA 
Period Three 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
In the 611 o f 1990 the Singh government collapsed after the BJP withdrew its support. 
Singh created the situation that led to the destruction o f his National Front coalition. On 
August 7,1990 the Singh administration announced the implementation job reservations 
that were called for by the decade-old Mandai Commission. The Mandai Commission 
called for the raising o f government job reservations for lower Hindu Castes from about 
25% to almost 50%. The Singh administration may have been able to brush aside the 
controversy that arose from the announcement o f the Mandai Commission, but Singh did 
not consult any o f the parties that were part o f the National Front coalition before the 
announcement. Riots and other anti-reservation demonstrations soon broke out all over 
India (Housego, September 29,1990).
The Singh government wanted to inq>lement the job reservations for political 
purposes. Singh knew that his coalition was unstable because o f the wide spectrum o f 
political parties in it. Because o f this situation, Singh gambled that by implementing job 
reservations he would be able to gain enough lower caste voters so that he could push the
42
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BJP out without destroying his government. When Singh announced the implementation 
o f the Mandai Commission he put the BJP m a very awkward situation. The BJP was 
opposed to the Mandai Commission because the jobs that it would take away from the 
upper castes. The upper caste voters were the people that were most likely to vote for the 
BJP. However, the BJP did not want to oppose the Mandai Commission completely, 
because that would be perceived as catering to the upper castes and would destroy any 
chance that they would have with getting the lower caste votes. The BJP decided on a 
compromise solution that they hoped would allow them to increase their support among 
all castes.
This compromise solution was to oppose the government by clahning that it was 
attenqning to divide Hindus. The BJP claimed that Hindus should be united and that they 
should not be divided by caste. This vision that the BJP held out was based on the idea 
that caste should be overwhelmed by a common Hindu identity. BJP leaders, to show 
their interest in a common Hindu identity, embarked on a 10,000 kilometer tour on 
September 25,1990 throughout India to mobilize Hindu opinion in 6vor o f building a 
temple in place o f the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, India. This tour was called the Rath 
Yatra (pilgrimage on a chariot). L.K. Advani rode in a jeep painted to look like a war 
chariot and called on all Hindus to engage in jok shakti (people power). This pilgrimage 
to Ayodhya was justified on the grounds o f maintaining Hindu unity above caste disunity. 
Advani used the slogan o f “people power” to bring forth the image o f Hindutva, or
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Hinduness. Hinduness conjures forth the imagery o f religious unity over individuality 
(Thakur, 1993).
On October 23, 1990 Singh ordered Advani^s arrest, before he could arrive at 
Ayodhya. Sii%h did this because he foared that if the BJP and its allies were allowed to 
destroy the Babri MagM that a  religious war could erupt between the Muslim and Hindus.
Singh atten^ted to prove that he was not acting out o f political motivation, but out o f 
love of his country. “It is not a question o f saving the government, but that o f saving the 
natioiL A hundred governments can come and go, but the nation should remain one.” 
(McGirk, October 24, 1990). Onfy four hours after Advani’s arrest, BJP leaders delivered 
notice to the President o f India that the BJP was withdrawing support for Singh’s 
government. The BJP cited many ftdlures o f the government, such as foiling to resolve the 
Ayodhya Mosque controversy and the hatred that Singh had caused between upper and 
lower-caste Indians when he attempted to implement the Mandai Commission.
The BJP began working on demands for the release o f Advani and other BJP leaders 
who had been detained. Curfews were implemented in many towns after people 
supporting Advani skirmished with police. The BJP also called for a nationwide strike 
until Advani was released. While not everyone went on strike, m aiy supporters o f  the 
BJP did. Even though Advani and m ai^ofthe BJP leaders were under arrest, the Rath 
Yatra continued towards Ayodhya and was scheduled to arrive there on October 30th.
The government had placed 100,000 security forces in Ayodhya to protect the Mosque.
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On October 30th tens o f thousands o f Hmdus arrived at Ayodhya and clashed with 
security forces. Although the government had sent 100,000 security forces, some Ifindu 
militants were able to get past them and damage the Mosque. The damaging o f the 
Mosque dealt a  heavy blow to the Muslims who were increasing^ worried about the 
governments’ ability to defend thenu Muslims began claiming that the security forces 
would not support them in the evait o f riots because o f the synqxathy they had for the BJP 
and Hindu militants. This lack o f feith in the government hurt Si%h and his government, 
who were counting on the support o f the Muslim vote in a general election.
On November 9,1990 the inevitable event occurred, Singh was voted out o f power. 
This event had been unavoidable since the BJP had withdrawn its support from the Singh 
coalMoiL Chandra Shekhar, a bitter eneny of Singh and a former member o f the Singh 
coalition, created a party called the Janata Dal-Socialist and made a deal with the 
Congress P ar^  for its siqjport. The Shekhar government was even more at the mercy of 
the Congress Party then Singh had been at the mercy o f the BJP. Shekhar only had 55 
supporters in the 548 seat parliament and depended completely on the 195 Congress Party 
members. The main reason that Shekhar was allowed to form a party was that the 
President o f India wanted to wait for communal tensions to cool down before calling as an 
election. The Congress Party had been asked if th^r wanted to form a coalition, but they 
had opted to wait for elections, hoping that th ^  would then be able to form a majority 
government (Crossette, November 11,1990). While these elections took place, there
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were still riots going on all over India. The riots had been started by the Rath Yatra and 
bad spread after the VHP vowed to extend the canqxaign to 3,000 other disputed mosques 
if the Ayodhya mosque was not turned into a temple
While the President o f India had hoped that communal tensions would calm down near 
the end o f 1990, they were actua% spiraling out o f control and the government could not 
seem to do ai^thing about h. Mistrust began to rise between the Hindus and the Muslims, 
the BJP leaders, such as Shakar Rawat a leader in Agra, were not helpii% the situation. 
“There’s a devil in the ordinary Moslem heart; you saw it in the past 
when they knocked down our tenqxles,.. Their population is on the 
increase rapidly. Soon they will be equal or the majority. Why aren’t 
they abidix% by the national interest and the rules for population 
control?’ (Coll, January, 2).
On March 7 Shekhar resigned as the leader o f India, possibty because the Ayodhya 
crisis could not be solved, and elections were announced for May. The BJP Vice 
President, K.R. MaOcani, took this opportunity to announce that the BJP would build a 
temple in Ayodlgra by October. “If we come to power, then construction will begin 
immediately,...If we don’t, construction will begin by October.” (Tarrant, March 18,
1991). The rest o f the political parties in India soon began labeling the BJP as a radical 
party that used every event in India as a possible political springboard to prominence. The 
ceremonial President o f India told the country that it should “get used to” coalition
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governments (Clad, March 31,1991). This plea to the country, however, was ignored by 
the political parties Wio immediately started attacking each other.
As the various political parties started attackmg the BJP for its non-secular policies at 
Ayodhya the BJP did something that surprised maty people. The BJP became more 
involved with the VHP and other Hindu nationalists. I f  the BJP had been attacked for 
being non-secular five or six years earlier it would have denounced the accusations and 
then attempted to look like a much more moderate party, but no more. “Jai Shri Ram” 
(Hail Lord Rama) became one o f the many religious slogans that could be increasingly 
heard at BJP political rallies. The BJP called for the abolishment o f the “pseudo­
secularism” and “minority appeasement” that the other political parties were calling for 
(Tiwari, April 5, 1991). Advani declared that a revolution was takii% place between the 
BJP and the government.
The BJP went so for as to get the blessing o f6,000 o f India’s most esteemed Hindu 
holy men to show that they truty were the party for Hindus. These holy men, in their 
a tten d  to get Hindus to vote for the BJP, declared that politics must give shape to the 
demands o f Hinduism (India; Rally for, April 13,1991). The BJP and the holy men v^o 
were followers o f the VHP fidled to note that Hinduism is a highly individualistic fohh and 
actual^ lacks aiQr hierarchy. Caste was created ly  the British and not by Indians. The 
BJP used the blessings to promote the idea o f Hindutva in order to attempt to organize 
Hindus in a way th ^  had never been organized.
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The battle in the elections soon became a race between the BJP, with Advani as its 
leader, and the Congress Party, with Gandhi as its leader. Advani immediately began 
attacking Advani and the Congress Party in every way possible. He accused Gandhi o f 
taking orders from Muslim preachers and o f tqxpeasing various Muslim nations, such as 
Iraq and Pakistan (Coll, April 29,1991). He claimed that Gandhi would inclement the 
Mandai Commission if brought to power and pleaded for Hindus throughout India to 
reject Gandhi and the Congress Party on election day. Any time criticism was aimed at 
Advani, he replied, “I will not be defensive [about Hinduism]. We have been defensive for 
too long.” (Swamy, May 17, 1991). The BJP soon expanded its call for Hindutva into a 
call for Rama Rajya (the period o f Rama). Rama Rajya is the nQfthical period o f Rama’s 
rule. The BJP claimed that when it ruled India it would return to a beautiful and n^thical 
India in wiiich everyone would live in harmony. The BJP forgot to tell everyone that 
Rama Rajya would actual^ only brmg h arm o ty  to Hmdus and that everyone else would be 
deemed a second class status. The BJP strategy after the first stage o f the elections put 
them in a good electoral position and looked like it would win them the election eas%. 
However, on May 21st the BJP’s dreams o f power were shattered.
On May 21st Gandhi was busy campaigning in the southern state o f Tamil Nadu when 
he was killed in a  bomb exqxlosion. T^thin hours riots erupted throughout India (India’s 
fragile political. May 22,1991). The assassination looked as if it could both hurt and bs\p 
the Congress Party. The death o f Gandhi ended a political dynasty stretching back to
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Jawaharlal Nehru, Rajiv Gandhi’s grandfother. The Nehru-Gandhi fomily had ruled India 
for 38 o f hs 44 years o f independence. This situatkxn posed as an interesting question to 
the Congress Party. Who would rule the Congress Party? Congress Party members soon 
became involved in a power struggle that would deckle the future ruler o f the party. 
Members o f the party saw the good that could possibty happen because o f the 
assassination: a sy n ^ th y  vote similar to the one that Rajiv Gandhi experienced after his 
mother was killed. Because o f Gandhi’s death, the elections were postponed. The 
postponement would allow the resolution o f the kadership issue and allow the party to 
gain synqxatly over Gandhi’s death.
The BJP attempted to c^italize on the disarray within India and the Congress Party by 
claiming that it was the onty hope for stability. It also argued that the entire basis o f 
stability within the Congress Party had been focused around one fomüy, and the leading 
members o f this fondly were dead. This proclamation stung the Congress Party and other 
political parties deepty. The statement frustrated the leaders o f the Congress Party 
because it had always claimed to be the party o f stability, but the Congress Party never 
really counter-attacked the BJP. The statement irked other political parties because they 
felt that the BJP had overstepped the bounds o f morality ly  attacking the Congress Party 
so soon after Gandhi’s assassination (Coll, May 27,1991).
The political climate, after the assassination o f Gandhi and the quick BJP attack on 
Congress, shifted to become a battle between the BJP and all other parties. Advani
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
claimed that he was not displeased with this outcome, “Before, the debate was pro- 
Congress and anti-Congress.. J4ow let the country be polarized between n y  view point 
and my antagonists’s. It’s a debate. Let it go o il ”  (TeA, May 30,1991). Politicians in 
other parties were also happy with the turn o f events, especialfy the leader o f the Janata 
Dal, VJ*. Singh. Singh had hated the BJP since th ^  had caused the foil o f his government 
in 1990: “The BJP is getting more and more politically isolated. Indeed, a new 
consensus is emerging across the entire political center and left, vddch is opposed to the 
sectarian politics and combative campaigning tactics o f the BJP.” (TefiFt, May 30, 1991).
When the final stages o f the elections arrived, the Congress Party won the majority in 
Parliament: 225 seats out o f 511 seats. Polls showed that Congress’s post-Gandhi 
assassination vote was nine percent higher than the first round. Had Gandhi not been 
assassinated, the BJP may have had more seats than the Congress party. The Congress 
Party was still in the tenuous position o f finding coalition partners to form a minority 
government or another party would be given the chance to form a government. The 
Congress Party was also left with the perilous track of choosing a Prime Minister within 
the party, perilous because o f the divisions that a choice could create in the party. The 
Congress Party picked P.V. Narasimha Rao, a moderate, to be the Prime Minister o f the 
coalition. Rao, to appease his rivals in Congress, appointed other people w*o had been 
jockeying to become Prime Minister in powerful positions in his cabinet. Rao promptly 
talked to many parties about possible coalitions. He was immediate^ rejected by most o f
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Mosque and pronounced that a tençle to Rama would be built. This declaration brought 
a wave o f protest throughout India. Singh and members o f his National Front coalition 
marched to Ayodhya to protest the acquisition o f the land, claiming that it would spark 
riots. The BJP ordered the arrest o f the protesters the moment they entered Ayodhya, 
claiming that they were disrupting communal harmony in the peaceful town. The BJP also 
argued that the National Front was anti-Hindu and was trying to placate minorities. The 
Supreme Court, however, disagreed and ordered the BJP not to build a temple.
The parafysis on the issue o f the Ayodhya mosque created divisions within the BJP 
government and threatened to stop the nxxmentum o f the movement. The divisions were 
between members o f the Uttar Pradesh BJP government, who had grown used to the 
perks that th^r had enjoyed since being elected and had pledged to follow strictly legal 
constitutional means on demolition o f the mosque, and the rest o f the BJP, x^o wanted to 
destroy the mosque any manner possible. The younger members o f the BJP were 
especially disgruntled with the parafysis on the Ayodhya issue: “We are disillusioned 
because we feel we have given them enough time.” (Coll, November 19,1991). The BJP 
leaders attempted to focus on other issues, such as following the Hindu way o f life. This 
was as an attempt to shift the issue away from Ayodhya. The BJP also announced the 
start o f another pilgrimage, similar to the one that Advani had done in 1990, but this one 
was not scheduled to go through Ayodlya. The pilgrimage had nothing to do with
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Ayodhya and was a desperate diversion to draw attention from Ayodhya (India: The 
Hindu, December 14, 1991).
Murli Joshi, the new presklent o f the BJP, started the march in late 1990. He bad 
planned to finish the march in Kashmir on India’s independence day so that the BJP could 
unfurl India’s flag in front o f everyone. The journey, with its climatic conclusion, was 
supposed to show the world that India was united against all separatists. The Ekta Yatra 
(unity march) did not get the great fanfare that the previous march to free Ayodhya bad 
gotten. From the begmning the other political parties, especially the Congress Party, had 
pleaded with the BJP not to go through with the march, claiming that the areas o f India 
that the march was scheduled to pass through were to dangerous. The BJP, however, 
spumed all attempts to get them to call off the march.
The call for the demolition of the Ayodhya mosque was absent from the rhetoric o f the 
BJP during this march. The BJP through this march attenqxted to cloak its sectarian image 
in the more attractive image o f nationalism. Joshi called for the people o f India to rally 
against the secessionist and anti-nationalist forces. Joshi even argued that the Muslims of 
India were converts from Hinduism and that they shared a cultural heritage with India’s 
Hindus, thus they should convert back to Hinduism (Tarrant, January 9,1992).
The march was uneventful until January 23rd, three days before the end o f the journey, 
when Sikh separatists attacked the travelers and killed five o f them. Joshi was forced to
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amend his plans o f bringing all o f his followers into Kashmir and instead took the 
Congress Party’s offer o f using a jet to %  80 o f the BJP members to Kashmir.
The unveiling of the Indian flag by the BJP was a  complete failure. The BJP was 
oumumbered by the number o f securi^ forces that h  took to protect them, and there were 
still militants shooting bullets and avoidmg the all day curfew that the government had 
enacted to protect the BJP. The march did not succeed in uniting the Indian people 
behind the BJP. Ifaiything the march emboldened militants to close their ranks and 
engage in a wage war against the country even more vigorous^ then before (Brown, 
January 28, 1992). The BJP realized that the diversion fl-om the Ayodl^a Mosque would 
not work, so they again focused on Ayodhya.
By the end o f March the BJP had started laying the groundwork for the building o f the 
temple. The BJP government in Uttar Pradesh deployed two bulldozers and started 
building a wall around the mosque. The Congress Party warned the BJP that it would 
sack the BJP government if it built the tenqxle. Advani, always with a quick wit, thanked 
the Congress Party for getting out the word that the BJP was working on its promise to 
build the temple: “What we could not convey to the people [about building the long- 
promised temple] is now being conveyed ly  those wdio criticize us.” (Guha, March 29, 
1992).
In July the BJP and its allies once again upped the ante in the battle over Ayodhya 
when 5,000 Kar Sevaks (religious volunteers) showed up and started rituals that marked
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the begmning o f building the ten^ie. The BJP government assured the central 
government that no work would begin on the tenqxle until the court order banning the 
temple was removed (Sklva, Juty 11,1992). The BJP government, to show its compliance 
with the law, canceled all police leaves until the crisis was over. Still, more volunteers 
arrived to cangx outside o f the mosque. Near the end o f Jufy the BJP and the Congress 
Party agreed on a settlement that bought the central government four months to find a 
solution. This compromise said that the court would render a verdict on the Ayodhya 
Mosque/Temple in four months. This conqxromise got the volunteers to disband their 
camps and go home, although most o f them were not happy with the settlement.
Four months went by, relativefy  ^uneventful, and still no court decision was rendered. 
The Congress Party seemed content to make the BJP wait and hope that the crisis would 
go away. By the end o f November Hindu religious volunteers were flowing into Ayodhya 
by the thousands and still the court rendered no decisiotL Pressure was mounting on Rao 
to do something about the crisis. Many in his government called for the dismissal o f the 
BJP Uttar Pradesh government and the implementation o f central government rule. Rao 
instead accepted the BJP’s promise that nothii% would happen to the mosque. Rao 
should have not listened to the BJP promises, especialfy vdxen the leader o f the BJP in 
Uttar Pradesh proclaimed that he believed in the Ayodhya crusade; “I will not hesitate to 
sacrifice my chair for the cause o f the Rama temple.” (Indian Parliament in, November 30,
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1992). By December 6,1992 at least 100,000 kar sevaks had assembled at the call o f the 
BJP. On that date the issue got out o f  control
THE EVIL
The BJP, in this rhetorical period, did not focus on one group as “the evil”, but 
attacked all Wio were secularists and secessionists. The BJP clanned that the “pseudo­
secularists” were the real villains in India and must be vanquished from the political arena. 
The BJP argued that these politicians were out to maintain their power by appeasing 
minorities and were not doing it for the good o f these people (Coll, January 2,1991). The 
BJP argued further that these minorities should accept the rule o f the Hindu majority and 
quit attempting to get preferential treatment.
The unity ride that the BJP enqxloyed early in 1992 was its atten^t to show the evils o f 
secessionist movements and as an attempt to get the population o f India to reject the 
militants. The BJP argued that there was a need for Indian unity in the new world order 
that was emerging and warned o f the dangers o f the tffeak up o f India. BJP members 
pointed to the breakup o f the former Soviet Union to prove their point.
VALUE APPEALS
Hindutva was the most prominent value appeal that the BJP made to the Indian 
populace. When Advani and the BJP brot%ht forth the idea o f Hindutva, or Hinduness, 
they were borrowing from a theory that V J). Savarkar created in 1923% Ttû&appeal was a 
blatant attenqxt to return to nationalist roots. There are many non-Hindu religions in India
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and the politics o f Hindutva aims at decreasing the significance o f these groups (Garvey,
1991). Hinduness proclaims that the Hindu religion gave birth to the religions o f Jains, 
Sikhs, and Indian Buddhists. Therefore, aH members o f these religions are actually 
Hindus.
The theory o f Hinduness states that non-Indic religions are foreign elements on the 
Indian subcontinent and should be rejected. These non-Indic re lio n s  are Christianity and 
Islam (Gold, 1991). By using the theory o f Hindutva, the BJP was attempting to unify the 
so called Indie religions into a voting block against the Congress Party and Singh.
Through its use o f Hinduness, the BJP was attenqxting to show that religious cohesiveness 
was more important than caste in Indian society (Oberoi, 1995). The BJP also used the 
value o f Hindutva to battle the Mandai Commission by claiming that the Singh 
government and the rest o f the Indian political parties were attempting to divide Hmdus 
and thus were not following the precept o f Hindutva. Joshi, for a short time, attempted to 
preach this kind o f unity without the religious rhetoric, but he soon found that this did not 
have the mass appeal that a religious Hindutva did. The BJP was also attenqxting to cloak 
its ideal o f Hindu supremacy behind the thin veil o f Hindu unity. The political strategy of 
Hindutva is a electoral strategy that has paid huge dividends for the BJP. “It largefy 
accounts for the considerable influence o f the BJP-VHP-RSS contingent in electoral 
politics.” (Frytenberg, 1993). However, by this strategy India’s Muslims, Sikhs, 
Buddhists, Christians, Jains, and other communities cannot be counted as trustworthy
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members o f India. By the BJP use o f Hmdutva these communities are increasingfy seen as 
impure and inferior.
The second most prominent value appeal, that goes band in hand with Hindutva, is the 
idea o f Ram Rajya (Ramas rule) or Hindu Nation.
They exploited the weakness o f the ruling elite and capitalized on 
the fears and insecurities ofthe Hindu majority. Channeling the 
economic and social frustrations o f Hindus, they were able to 
appeal to many diverse groups o f Hindus with a broad range of 
disparate messages (Kolodner, 1995, p. 242).
The messages that Eric Kolodner is talking about are actually as an elaborate rhetorical 
vision that the BJP has created in as an attempt to get people to vote for it. The majority 
o f the rhetorical vision that the BJP has “created” is actually just a  theory created by V.D. 
Savarkar in his book Hindutva. The theory that Savarkar created is called hindu rostra 
(Hindu Nation). Hindu Nation proposes that the subcontinent o f India is one culture and 
one people. This theory stands in sharp contrast to the current nation-state, which is a 
territorially and politically defined entity (Gold, 1991, p. 548).
While the BJP does not feel, or at least say in its discourse, that the whole Indian 
subcontinent should be reunited, the BJP does believe that a Hindu Nation would make 
India greater. The BJP version o f Hindu Nation is divisive and at the same time uniting. 
While the idea o f unifying and dividing at the same time may seem to be a contradiction, it
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is not. Advani has continuous^ referred to the unity that the BJP is attenqxting to achieve.
At the end o f 1991 and begmning o f 1992 Joshi marched throughout India in as an a 
desperate call to unify India. On this march Joshi even stated that Muslims and other 
religious minorities in India were in actuality Hindus had been converted to other 
religions. Through this discourse, the BJP was attempting to unify the so called Hindu 
community. The BJP creates the vision o f unity by excplaining that all people are allowed 
into the Hindu nation that they seek to create. However, as Martin E. Marty and R. Scott 
Appleby (1993) show, the effect o f this “unity” is actualfy assimilation into the Hindu 
community.
They seek to “Hinduize” all o f India, which they refer to as 
“Hindustan,” the sacred Hindu nation. All citizens o f Hindustan, 
including Sikhs, Muslims, Christians, Jains, Buddhists, and Marxdsts 
must put aside ethnic, religious, or ideological beliefe and practices that 
conflict with the dominant Hindu ethos.... (p. 627)
The BJP allows all groups to join the Hindu nation, but onfy if these groups want to 
give up their identities. The loss o f identity fits in with the ideologies ofthe Hindu nation 
and Hinduness, since these ideas favor the community over individuality. The newly 
converted groups o f Hindus are asked to rise up and resist the oppression o f the Hindu 
community by the government and other minorities. The rhetorical vision creates the “us 
versus them" mentality wiiich creates a division between Muslims and Hindus. Many in
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this Hindu communify feel that the Muslims are given preferential treatment. This view is 
reflected in the words o f as an anonymous Hindu
My temples have been desecrated, destroyed. Their sacred stones are 
being tranqxkd under the aggressor’s feet. My gods are crying. Th^r 
are demanding o f me for reinstatement in all their original glory. When 
I speak out n y  agoiy, you ofthe secular tribe condemn me as a threat 
to our “secular peace.” You add insult to n y  injury. You rub sak into 
n y  wounded heart, and still expect me to keep n y  mouth shut?...
Anything otgected to by the “minorities” as Hindu becomes a cause of 
intense concern for you. Even the breaking o f a coconut or lighting a 
lanq) is taboo. For you, our national life minus every bit o f Hindu is 
secularism. In short, you want me to cease to be myself... Sometimes,
I realty pity you for your diseased mind. Can you not see the simple 
fact that I form 85% o f this land? (Oberoi, 1993, p. 100)
This quotation shows that wixile the BJP says all are welcome in the Hindu Nation, the 
Hindu Nation will onty accept the converted. The BJP attempts to use this value to 
portray the policies o f the ruling Congress Party as favoring the Muslims. This vision has 
resulted in m a ty  Hindus becoming increasingty aware o f a Hindu identity that has been 
created by the BJP. The BJP has used the division that this rtietorical vision creates to 
increase their voter base with Hindus.
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The BJP has used the value o f a  Hindu Nation to focus on the Ayodhya Mosque. The 
BJP claim that the mosque should be a temple because it is the bkthplace o f Rama. The 
idea that this birthplace was extremely significant to the Hmdus was, in reality, a fantasy 
propagated by the BJP to build the backmg o f the Hindu community. The mosque m 
Ayodhya was virtually unknown in historical records, and there had been almost no 
controversy over the mosque fi'om 1949-1984 (Embree, 1994). The BJP found as an 
issue that no other group was focusing on and decided to create a controversy vfaere none 
had existed before. The BJP created the controversy o f  Ayodhya to rally the constructed 
Hindu community behind it.
The BJP claimed that the move to a  Hindu Nation would spark the return o f Ram 
Rajya. Ram Rajya is the time when Rama was the ruler o f the land. This is a very 
mythical rhetorical vision. Ram Rajya, the BJP claimed, would be a place where all 
Hindus would be able to live in peace and harmony, never having to fear anythn%. The 
rhetorical vision created by the BJP hints that Ram Rajya would also incorporate the 
Hindu Nation into it, thus India would span all across Asia (Gold, 1991, p. 546). Through 
this rhetorical vision that the BJP has created. Ram Rajya is the only way to achieve 
utopia. Ram Rajya is the vision that the BJP used x^*en canqxaigning in 1991 (Oberoi, p. 
107). The BJP did not realize it, but they would have to soon change their values and 
strategies because o f Wxat was about to happen in Ayodhya.
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CHAPTERS 
THE MODERATION OF THE BJP 
Period Four 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
On December 6, 1992 at 11:45 a.m. a small frenzied group o f the now 300,000 kar 
sevaks charged through the police lines and started attacking the Babri Magid mosque. 
This action triggered a mass riot which resuhed in the destruction o f the mosque. The 
BJP did not try to stop the eradication o f the mosque. The leveling o f the mosque threw 
India into chaos. Ramesh Thakur illustrates (1993):
The demolition o f the mosque plunged India into the worst outbreak o f 
communal violence since partition, with 1,700 dead and 5,500 injured.
The savage communal riots in Calcutta, seat o f a Communist Party 
government for more than a decade, and Bombay, home to the 
Laxmiputras (sons o f Laxmi, the wealth goddess), sent shock 
waves throt%h a country unaccustomed to seeing such eruptions in its 
principal cosmopolitan cities. Scenes o f Muslims in the thousands 
crowding railway stations in a desperate effort to escsqxe from Bombay
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were reminiscent o f the mass exodus after the post-partition riots (p.
645).
The violent discourse that had oozed fi'om the leadership o f the BJP during the days 
before the riots turned the masses o f Hindus into as an unstoppable hurricane o f violence. 
Much to its dismay, the national government had miscalculated the strength o f the BJP’s 
beliefa. The government did not truty believe that members o f the BJP were ready to die 
for their cause, although the rhetoric they had espoused befixre the riots should have been 
a warning to the Indian National government.
The Rao government quickty attenqxted to make up ftxr its miscalculation and 
dismissed the BJP Uttar Pradesh government, claiming that it was the BJP governments’ 
fault that the riots occurred. The Rao government then dismissed the other three BJP 
state governments, claiming th ^  had also been involved in the riots.
The leadership o f the BJP quickty attempted to control the damage that had been done 
to their reputation. Kewal Malkani, the vice president o f the BJP, claimed that “The 
masses are delighted...Look at Maharashtra, [the state vfaich includes Bombay and has 
bom the brunt o f the post-Ayodhya violence]. If  we had as an election there tomorrow 
we would win.’’ (Wagstyl, December 11,
1992). The BJP blamed the central government ftxr causing the riots. The BJP
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argued that the government had stalled the settling o f the Ayodlqra dispute in the courts 
for more then the four months. Four months, the BJP pointed out, had been the deadline 
set for resolution o f the affeir.
These riots shocked the moderate members o f the BJP. The riots, although a symbolic 
victory for the BJP because it had finalty completed its canqxaign promise, almost struck 
the death blow to the BJP because many o f the moderate BJP members distanced 
themselves from the group. The moderate BJP members believed that the Mosque should 
have been brought down but wanted it done nonviolently (Datyrymple, December 13,
1992).
Middle class and upper class Hindus were most likety to support the destruction ofthe 
Mosque (Chhibber and Misra, 1993). These groups identified with the status quo. The 
destruction o f the Mosque was symbolic o f the oppression o f the Muslim minority and the 
upholdii% o f the current system. The rich and middle class had the most to lose if the 
current system collapsed. They felt that the BJP would help them keep the Muslims 
oppressed wdiile maintaining their place in society.
The destruction o f the Babri Masjid mosque marked a turning point for the BJP 
because it could no longer use the mosque as a raltying cry in elections as they had done 
since 1986. In the aftermath o f the Ayodhya mosque destruction, the BJP had few issues 
that they could focus on. These issues were the sacking o f the BJP state governments, the 
arrest o f Advani and other BJP leaders, and the banning o f the RSS and the VHP by the
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central government. This focus on these issues was as an attempt by the BJP to rally 
people to its cause.
The BJP disrupted parliament by bursting m and wavmg black banners and calling Rao 
the “murderer o f democracy” (Barr, December 17,1992). The BJP found allies in its 
crusade against the Congress Party on the issues o f Advani’s arrest and on the sacking o f 
all o f the BJP state governments, except for Uttar Pradesh. Other political parties in India 
foh that the arrest o f Advani and the sacking o f the state governments was unjust because 
they were seen as unconnected with the riots that had occurred after the destruction o f the 
mosque. The BJP called for a no-confidence vote against the Congress Party, but it was 
overwhelmingly defeated in parliament. The other parties fek that some o f what the 
Congress Party had done was unjust, but the parties were unwilling to destroy the 
government because they feared that the BJP would win if elections were called.
After the Ayodhya riots, the BJP became nxxre and more radical in ks rhetoric, while 
increasing in power (Clarke, June 12, 1993). While this statement may seem to contradict 
the statement above that the riots almost brought the death knell o f the BJP, k really 
coincides perfectty. As the BJP increased in power, k was also alienating more and more 
o f ks followers. On one hand, the BJP was increasing in power because o f ks radical 
nature and discourse. However, this rise in power was destined to be short lived because 
the BJP, through ks radical rhetoric, was alienating more and more o f the moderate 
voters. So wfoDe they won some state elections, they were also losing the votes that they
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so desperatety needed to win the national elections. However, the BJP had always drawn 
most o f hs voters from the radical parts o f sockfy, thus if  the BJP moderated its discourse 
it might stop the rise in power that the BJP desired.
As the BJP became more radical and mcreasmgty ready to upset the balance o f power 
in India, it started searching for more belkfa that would increase its power base with the 
Hindu voters. Almost all o f the beliefa that they backed were anti-Muslim. They started 
campaigning to stop the infiltration o f illegal Muslhn refugees fixxm Bangladesh (Clarke, 
June 12, 1993). Some o f the other anti-Muslim issues that the BJP backed were the 
acquisition o f nuclear weapons by India to counterbalance Pakistan, a Muslim country, 
and the taking away o f basic human rights for Indian Muslims (Clarke, June 12, 1993).
By the end o f 1993, the BJP looked as if it had seen its peak. The BJP had been voted 
out o f power in three o f the four states where it had taken power in onty two years earlier 
(Aggarwal, December 3,1993). The surprising thing about these elections was that 
tradMonalty weak groups banded together and formed political coalitions with the sole 
purpose o f defeating the BJP. However, this coalition also stopped the Congress Party 
from winning soundty and thus returning some legitimacy to the party. This coalition also 
served notice to the BJP that if its rhetoric was radical, the BJP would never attain power.
The death o f the BJP was pronounced with glee. Congress Spokesman V N Gadgil 
stated, “The verdict o f these elections is as an endorsement o f the decision to dismiss BJP 
governments in the four states. The election results are a tremendous rebuff for the BJP”
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(AggarwaL December 3,1993). At the end o f 1993, it Gna% seemed that the BJP and its 
rhetorical campaign were on its way to the grave. However, the pronouncement was 
premature.
By 1994 the BJP was desperate to find a new subject that would excite the militants 
within the party. The BJP organized 2,000 volunteers to get the government to take a 
hard-line stance against Kashmir, Wiich is primarify Muslim. At first, the BJP used 
nonviolent activities, combined with a touch o f violent rhetoric. However, when the 
nonviolence 6Hed, the BJP leadership increased its use o f violent and confi’ontational 
discourse. As the rhetork became increasing^ violent, so did the BJP. The BJP was 
calling for airstrikes against the city to punish ^ ^iiat it labeled Muslim militants. The BJP 
seemed to be caught in its own web o f violent rhetoric.
When the government refused to use airstrikes against the populace, the BJP turned to 
using violence against the Muslims. At least 800 BJP activists were arrested in the 
Kashmir protests (India’s Hindu Party, June 23,1994). Rhetoric, such as these protests, 
that the BJP used to keep militants in their camp was usualfy very low keyed and not 
broadcast all over India. The BJP seemed to have realized finalty that, while it needed the 
radicals to stay in the party, it did not have to fiaunt the radical presence continual^.
By the summer o f 1995, the BJP was once again experiencing popularity 
throughout India. Its new success was owed to its “insistence on a strong Hindu ethos, a 
fiee market stance, its promise to be tough on Kashmir and Pakistan and its attacks on
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corruption” (Fishlock, September 1, 1995), The BJP brandished its rhetorical sword 
brilliant^. The rhetoric that the BJP used, such as charging that Muslims intended to out 
breed Hindus and that Muslims were not committed to a strong India, kept the militants 
in its camp. The BJP also stated that it wanted to, “kick out all Muslims.” (Fishlock, 
September 1,1995).
The BJP attended to moderate its rhetoric by aUegh% that the reason that they were 
calling for a Hindu nationalism was that all o f India was threatened by Islamic 
fundamentalism (Austin and Lyon, 1993). By inserting the threat o f Islam into its rhetoric, 
the BJP was attempting to deiy that it was calling for Hindu nationalism just to get votes. 
The BJP claimed that Islam was a  threat and that Hindu nationalism was the cure to this 
threat. The BJP still believed more in the militant side of its platform. They just realized 
that they needed the moderate votes to win elections. The BJP still demonized Muslims: 
Muslims can speak o f Islam, but apparently Hindus cannot speak o f 
Hinduism. Hindu nationalists demonise Muslims. They say that they 
are pan^iered by the government, that they intend to out breed Hindus, 
that they are not committed to India-and cheer for Pakistan in the test 
matches (Fishlock, September 1, 1995).
The BJP used this demonization o f Muslims to exploit Hindu perceptions that the 
government was treating the Muslim minori^ better than the Hindu majority. The BJP
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was, in essence, creating the threat o f Islamic fundamentalism as a scapegoat for all o f the 
problems in India.
By 1995, the BJP had brought moderates back into its camp by removing the hateful 
rhetoric from its national platform and taking a stance on the economy. The BJP folt the 
mam reason that it had been voted out o f power was that it had not formulated a socio­
economic model into its Aetoric that would appease and excite the populace.
BJP leader Govindacharya folt his party foiled because it was unable to 
move from its promise to build a Ram tenq>le in Ayodhya to 
formulating a socio-economic model o f “Ram Rajya” (a period o f just 
rule in a nqfthical golden age) (Aggarwal, December 3, 1993).
The BJP vowed that this setback was tenqx>raiy, and it could not be stopped from 
taking over as the rulers o f India. In the next two years, the BJP formulated as an 
economic policy that, it asserted, was a free-market stance. Contrary to what the BJP 
claimed, its economic policy was protectionism or economic nationalism at its worst. 
Whatever the BJP wanted to call it, its economic policy became extremely popular with 
the populace. The BJP even began to let people know that its economic policy was 
somewhat protectionist. Trying to bring forward the imagery o f a war on as an economic 
battlefield, the BJP, “has identified it (Swadeshi) as the battle-cry for the poUs.”(Handoo, 
December 6,1995). The battle cry for its economic policy became, “as an econony of 
the people, by the people, and for the people.” (Handoo, December 6,1995).
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By the summer o f 1995, the BJP had organized non-violent protest groups throughout 
India, Aus getting its economic message out to the populace.
About 100 protesters gathered in the rain in New Delhi, smashing 
bottles o f Pepsi and shouting slogans denouncing the policies o f Prime 
Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, who opened up the Indian market in 
1991. “Foreigners go home,” screamed right-wing activists from the 
Forum for National Awakening. Protesters vented their anger mainly 
at Pepsi, one o f the best-known foreign brands. They burned a poster 
showing a Pepsi bottle topped by a hat bearmg a U.S. flag and passed 
out pamphlets headed “Declaration o f War” and “Pepsi leave India.”
(Graves, August 9,1995).
Colonel Sanders o f Kentucky Fried Chicken and Pepsi became the key hate symbols in 
this battle for power. Through its rhetoric, the BJP demonized the junk food culture and 
proclaimed that junk food should be abolished throughout India. It also attacked other 
corporations such as Dupont and various power companies, but Kentuclqr Fried Chicken 
and Pepsi were highlighted the most in the BJP Aetorical can^yaign. The BJP attempted 
to formulate a policy that was the opposite o f the status quo. The Congress Party was 
liberalizing and reforming the economy. The economic situation had not set well wiA Ae 
section o f the populace that was used to subsidies. Not onfy were subsidies being 
removed, but infiation was at 8 percent, a rate which hurt the poor (Goldenberg, 
September 15, 1995). This economic policy attracted the lower class to the BJP as never
70
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
before. The BJP had always primarify been a party for the upper middle class and the 
upper class. The BJP still did not attract many lower class citizens. The BJP had a 
problem attracting lower class people because o f one o f hs core beliefo, which was to 
mamrain the caste system and protect the mterests o f Hindu busmess people. The BJP 
also advocated against privileges for the lower classes. This new battle cry had the 
Congress Party running scared, since the Congress Party usualfy  ^got the lower class votes. 
In reality, Ae BJP had only used the rhetoric o f Hinduism to unite the Hindus. The BJP 
was forced into modifying its rhetorical focus for the elections once it realized that Ae 
issue o f religion would never propel it into power (Kolodner, 1995, p. 251).
The race that would decide what party would rule India heated up Ae beginning o f
1996. The five-year-rule mandate o f Ae Congress Party was drawing to a close, and it 
had to call elections by the end o f May. The realization that elections were coming 
resulted in alliances between parties across the political spectrum. The BJP started allying 
itself wiA different caste parties, such as the Bhangis caste (one o f the lowest castes), in as 
an attempt to show that it was not just a party for the rich castes.
The BJP, at this point, was looking for another issue besides  ^Hindutva and economics 
that would excite the populace. The party thought that it had found this issue by taking as 
an anti-corruption stance, since most o f the political parties in India were seen as corrupt, 
except the BJP. However, on January 16th, the Central Bureau o f Investigation (CBI) 
took away the BJP’s chances to capitalize on the corruption issue. The CBI charged 
seven politicians, including key Congress leaders, L.K Advani, and other opposition
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leaders with receiving bribes. This scandal led to the resignation o f Advani, wAo denied 
Ae charges, but quit because the BJP wanted to make corruption as an issue (Goldenberg, 
January 17, 1996). The corruption scandal was quickfy labeled a political tool being used 
by Rao to dispose o f his political opponent. He soon retaliated by stating that even some 
o f his cabinet members had been charged wiA corruption. However, the opposition 
parties noted that the cabinet members had all been possible contenders o f Rao in Ae 
election.
The scandal rapidly spiraled out o f Rao’s control The Supreme Court ordered Ae 
CBI to speed up hs investigation and to quh reporting to Rao. This court order resulted 
in Ae implich idea that Rao was also corrupt. The Congress Party also looked worse off 
than Ae BJP because Advani had resigned when he was charged whh corruption, while 
most o f the Congress Party members who had been charged resigned after initially fighting 
Ae charges (Zubrzycki, January 22,1996).
The BJP and other political parties, seeing that the Congress Party was starting to be 
on Ae defensive, attacked Rao and claimed that he had taken bribes during his years in 
ofGce. “There is a prima fecie case that the Jain brothers [key suspects in the scandal] 
made payments to the prime minister to win fevours,” said Sushma Swaraj, a 
spokeswoman o f the BJP (Chanda, January 22,1996). Vajpayee also accused Rao o f 
accepting bribes from the Jains. Vajpayee went so for as to claim that he had seen 
evidence that Rao had accepted 1.1 million dollars in bribes during the 1991 elections to 
secure a ruling mandate. The Congress party attempted to disniss the allegations, but
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more and more evidence implicated Rao m the scandal Chandraswami, Rao’s spvitual 
adviser, testified to the CBI that he had taken Rao to meet one o f Ae Jain brothers m 
1991. RJC. Dhawan, one o f the Congress ministers who resigned after being charged wiA 
corruption, testified that he had taken one o f the Jain brothers to meet Rao in 1991. This 
information was the final straw that crushed any chance o f Rao being able to turn Ae 
scandal mto as an electoral advantage. However, the scandal also destroyed Ae BJP’s 
hopes o f being able to make corruption as an issue during Ae campaign.
The final result o f the scandal was to put much uncertainty into the campaign. AH o f 
Ae political parties were attacking each other, but also looking for possible allies in Ae 
event o f a hung parliament. A hung parliament is exactfy what resulted in the elections, 
wiA Ae BJP gaining the most seats. Polls before the scandal erupted had predicted Ae 
BJP winning as an outright majority in the Lok Sabha. However, Ae scandal created a 
political climate o f mistrust that hurt the national parties: The BJP, the Congress Party, 
and Ae Janata D al The result was a parliament which consisted o f matgr regional parties 
that had increased in power. The BJP increased its seats to 160, but this was not enough 
to gain a majority.
THE EVIL
The BJP, in this rhetorical period, focused on the Congress Party as “the evil”. The 
main reason that the BJP once again focused strictfy on the Congress Party was because it 
realized that the Congress Party was the strongest political party in India. Thus, the BJP 
reasoned that if it were able to defeat the Congress Party, it would achieve political
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dominance. The BJP used every political tool that it could muster in as an attempt to 
defeat the Congress ParQr.
VALUE APPEALS 
Hindutva was still a  prominent value appeal made by the BJP during this rhetorical 
period, but, as I noted earlier in this c h ^ e r , the BJP attenqned to keep this out o f the 
national headlines. This was a blatant attenq)t to keep the moderates in the party, since 
Ae BJP felt that these voters were key to its rising popularity.
Economic nationalism was the other prominent value ^ipeal during this rhetorical 
period. The BJP continual^ attacked the Congress Party’s economic reforms, because 
Aey, A e BJP claimed, were actualfy allowing the western nations to take over India, just 
like during the colonial period. The BJP denounced the arrival o f what it called junk food 
culture from the west. The BJP claimed that it was desirable to have high technology 
shipped in from other countries, but not to allow low technology industries to come to 
India.
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CHAPTER 6 
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
On May 15th, the President o f India gave the BJP hs first chance to form a 
government, and, as a result, Vajpayee became the Prune Minister (Berfield and 
Ranawana, May 24,1996). Vajpayee immediately began looking for possible allies. He 
only found 20 members o f Parliament who were willing to back him and his party, for 
short o f a majority. AH o f Ae other political parties unhed against Ae BJP and hs 
traditionally nationalist policies. On Nfoy 28th, Vajpayee resigned as Prune Minister o f 
India, robbing his enemies o f the chance to disgrace Ae BJP by caUing a no-confidence 
vote which would have resulted in every poHtical party being able to pubUcly show hs 
disdain towards Ae BJP.
The President o f India approached Ae Congress Party and asked h to form the next 
government, but the Congress Party turned down the invitation. This refusal came about 
possibly because the Congress Party had seen what had happened to the last two coalition 
govenunents. The President then approached the Unhed Front coalition and asked h to 
form a government. The coaHdon agreed to form a government. The coalhion assembled 
a government that consisted o f 13 parties and the Congress Party supporting the coaUtion 
from Ae outside. The coalition was declared to be dead before h even began. There were 
two main reasons for this: One, the coaHdon relied on the stHl poHdcalfy strong Congress 
Party that would probably withdraw hs support when h feh that h could win as an
75
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election. Two, the coalition consisted o f free market parties and Communists, groups that 
are almost always diametricalfy opposed (Sidhva, May 30, 1996). HT). Gowda, a 
politician who was not known by many outside o f his small state, was sworn in as Prime 
Minister on June 1,1996. Gowda was chosen to be the leader o f the United Front 
coalition because o f his virtual anonymity among the various political parties. He was Ae 
third choice o f the coalition because Ae previous choices were unacceptable to various 
members o f Ae coalition.
More than anything else, Ae 1996 elections proved that the populace was angry wiA 
Ae Congress Party (Lev, June 7,1996). The elections resulted in no mandate for any 
political party and perluq)s showed that the Indian populace wanted coalition rule. Arun 
Nehru, nephew o f Indira Gandhi, stated, “Coalition politics is here to stay,” (Lev, June 7,
1996). WiA the Congress Party losing half o f the seats that it had possessed m Ae 
previous parliament and the BJP still short o f enough votes to form a government, Ae 
leadership o f India fell to the United Front, ^Aich had no discernible philosophy. The lack 
o f a philosoply was made clear when it delayed the release o f a position paper ly  several 
days, and even then, it was so small that it was aptly called the “minimum common 
program.” (Lev, June 7,1996).
The lack o f power o f the United Front, without the Congress Party backing, was clear 
when Gowda ordered the CBI to stop investigating former Prime Minister Rao on the 
issue of his corruptioiL It was alleged that the Congress Party told the United Front that it
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would withdraw its support from the government if Rao was prosecuted (Zubrzycki, June 
20, 1996). The instability m India has not onfy affected Ae coalitkn government. The 
BJP has also been affected.
The past year has been a period o f transitkn for the BJP wiA internal conflicts 
appearii% in almost every state that the BJP holds power. This internal division within Ae 
BJP is especialfy disturbing for the BJP leadership, because the BJP is usually known for 
its unity and discipline. The reason that many o f these divisions are now appearing is 
because o f the foiled attenqrt by the BJP to form a working government. The BJP bad 
Aougfat that it had played all o f its cards correctly and would be in power by Ae beginning 
o f June, 1996. Instead, the BJP fell short o f a majority and saw itself opposed by almost 
every oAer political party in India.
The internal BJP division has created three different foctions. The first group is 
composed o f compromisers wiio believe that the BJP must cast off most o f its Hindutva 
beliefo to project itself as a  viable governing party in India. This group wants the BJP to 
become a political party in the Congress tradition, except that it would be much more 
disciplined and less corrupt. This group would like the BJP to still pander to the Hindu 
voters, but it would also like for the BJP to be able to attract minorities (Ayoob, Winter,
1997).
The second group is composed o f the tactical conqvomisers who want to make 
conqiromises in the short term to make the BJP look better to the voters. This group, led
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by Vajpayee and his supporters, agrees with the first group that without compromises on 
issues such as Hindutva, the BJP will never achieve national power. However, unlike the 
first group, this group would attempt to implement the policies once it consolidated power 
and swayed the majority o f the Hindu population into acceptmg the BJP as the rulers o f 
India (Ayoob, Winter, 1997).
The third school o f  Aought encompasses ideological purists, who see attempts at 
conqiromises as a betrayal and exercises in fiitflhy. This group is composed o f Ae VHP 
and Ae RSS. This group sees the foil ofthe BJP government as showing that the oAer 
parties will never accept the BJP and its allies. This group advocates going it alone and 
attempting to achieve a  majority, without forming coalitions. They believe that Ae 
electorate will soon reject the United Front, just as they have spumed Ae Congress Party, 
and vote Ae BJP into power. A indication o f the displeasure o f this group wiA all 
conq>romises was the refusal o f the RSS to attend Vajpayee’s swearing in ceremony 
(Ayoob, \\Tnter, 1997).
The internal divisions o f the BJP has created some problems for the BJP over the past 
year. In the state o f Gujarat, a BJP controlled state, the national leadership o f the BJP 
outright stopped certain BJP menobers from running as BJP candMates. The members that 
were denied access to the political tickets rose up and fought street battles wiA oAer BJP 
members, who were seen as fovored by the national leadership. The members were seen 
as fovored by Vajpayee and his supporters because o f the moderate views, abandoning
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Hindutva, that they took. The members that were denkd tickets formed then own 
political party (Handoo, Jufy 31,1996). In October o f 1996, more BJP legislators 
defected to the new political groiq>. This resulted in the toppling o f the BJP state 
government (13 IBndu Nationalist, October 29,1996).
At the same time that this was occurring, the BJP was experiencing as an internal 
revolt in Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state. Agam, the revolt concerned the 
apparent fevor o f certain BJP members that were seen as political^ popular. The national 
leadership o f the BJP promised a post to a person that was part o f a backward caste, 
which was unacceptable to the state leadership of the BJP. This internal division within 
Ae BJP resulted m a hung parliament in Uttar Pradesh when elections were held there in 
October o f 1996. Rryastan was also eiqieriencing as an open war between the supporters 
o f Vajpayee and Advani (Handoo, Jufy 31, 1996).
1997 has proven to be a much better year for the BJP than the months after the 1996 
elections. Rao resigned as Congress President and Parliament leader and was replaced by 
Sharam Kesri, a former Rao loyalist. This brought up many doubts within the Congress 
Party. Kesri is not known as a good canqiaigner. The onfy positive quality that he is 
known for is raising fimds for campaigns. While in the past the raising o f funds might 
have been perceived as a virtue, now it is perceived as a negative aspect and is associated 
wiA corruption (Zubrzycki, January 6,1997).
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The BJP has also set to repairmg its discipline and unity. In January the BJP set up a 
new school, in addition to the RSS school’s, to train party activists. This school is 
supposed to imbue parQr unity. “We see indisc^line as as an organizational weakness, we 
are in the process o f putting into place a grievance redressai mechanism,” said Advani 
(Fernandez, January 12,1997). The BJP’s recent attempt to unify itself has resulted in Ae 
BJP taking part in a coalition government in the Punjab, the first ever BJP there, and in 
Uttar Pradesh.
The United Front coalition will also most likely foil by the end o f April On March 29, 
Kesri announce the withdrawal o f Congress Party support for the United Front coalition. 
The announcement was not onfy unexpected news to pundits throughout the world, but 
many Congress members had also not been told that the party was withdrawing its support 
(Naqvi, March 30,1997). The withdrawal o f the Congress Party’s support will most 
likefy result in new elections, even though Gowda has vowed to fight until it is proven he 
does not have enough support. However, Gowda has until mid-April to find allies because 
parliament is on recess until then (Ruling Coalition in, March 31, 1997).
IMPLICATIONS
Observations can be made in this thesis, which examined sixteen years o f BJP rhetoric, 
spanning from the creation o f the BJP in 1980 to the 1996 elections in which the BJP held 
power for 13 days by detailing the value appeals o f this group, similar to the detailing that
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Darsey engaged upon. The BJP emerged from the foUen Janata Coalition with a clear 
agenda: it wanted to rule India.
This period was identi&d by the BJP’s attempt to separate itself from the RSS and 
unify itself against the Congress Party. The BJP feh that the RSS had isolated the Jana 
Sangh from all other political groups, which kept h from achieving real power, and had 
Aen been the cause o f the Janata coalitions’ fell The second period lasted for four years 
and reflected the BJP’s belief that h had to go back to its RSS and Jana Sangh roots or 
forever live in the history books. 1990 to 1992 marked the further radicalization o f the 
BJP, which ended in the destruction of the Babri Masgid Mosque. The last period marked 
a turn back to moderatiotL During this period, Vajpayee was returned as Ae leader o f Ae 
BJP, and he attempted to moderate the BJP so it could take power. Each o f these periods 
marked Ae charge in what the BJP saw as “Ae evfl”. However, Ae BJP always saw part 
o f Ae evil as the Congress Party. The advancement o f the BJP’s rhetoric, examined wiA 
Ae catalytic events, allows a few general observations about the BJP.
BJP as Poppelganggr 
The BJP always seems to be one step ahead o f its opponents in the political arena.
Each time, this doppelganger o f politics changes its rhetorical appearance. It gains more 
momentum in its drive toward its goal o f ruling the national government o f India. One can 
always hope that the BJP will be uncovered as the changing, unethical, conniving group 
that it is, but I predict that the BJP will be able to hide its true tqjpearance through
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rhetorical means and gain political power in the elections that wiH have to be called in
1997. The BJP has proven to be a master doppelganger able to master changing rhetorical 
platforms and policies at its discretfon, without the populace backlashmg to a flip-flop in 
policies.
The BJP learned much in their loss in the spring o f 1996. The BJP knew how to 
moderate and mutate its rhetoric to fit the public will, but the BJP has gotten even better 
at this game after they saw how much the other political parties hate them. Now the BJP 
is speaking out ofboA  sides o f its mouth. On one hand, the BJP is sayn% that Aey accept 
everyone in their party and that they do not want to kill Muslims. On the oAer hand, Ae 
BJP is once again afRrmmg their commitment to build the Hindu temple in Ayodhya. This 
doublespeak that the BJP is enqxloying has put much pressure on the United Front 
coalition.
The more doublespeak that the BJP employs, the more stances that the BJP co-opts 
from Ae different parties within the United Front coalition. The Aetoric that the BJP uses 
is hurting the coalition because, as a party’s stance is co-opted ty  the BJP, another party 
within the coalition distances itself fiom the party that has had its stance co-opted. The 
parties distance themselves from the p ar^  that has had its stance co-opted because aU o f 
them hate the BJP so much. This fracturing o f the coalition has led to a further 
disillusionment within the populace towards the coalition, thus resulting in as an increase 
in the popularity o f the BJP, because they are seen as outsiders.
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Expansion Is Dangerous 
The BJP, over the years, has found itself walkn% a political tightrope. While the BJP 
has become a doppelganger and attempted to mutate its stances it has also alienated some 
o f its followers. The BJP has found itself in a quandary: expand its vote block into Ae 
lower castes and minorities and lose many o f its upper caste followers or pander to Ae 
upper caste followers and lose out on the increase in votes. The BJP has gone back and 
forA on the issue. In the earfy eighties, the BJP gave up its allegiance to the RSS and 
attempted to get votes from the poorer strata o f sociefy. Later, the BJP attempted to 
unify Ae Hindu populace behind the ideas o f Hindutva and Ram Rajya, but it found that 
Aese issues could not win the national election. The BJP, in the final period, attempted to 
moderate again, but found that many o f the other political parties would not believe that 
Ae BJP had moderated. The BJP is again m a period o f changing hs values, but Aese 
values have not yet been de&ied.
BJP Rhetoric Relies on "The Evil"
I f  nothing else is certain, the BJP’s survival depends on the ability to create or focus 
on “Ae evil”. The BJP would never have been formed had h not been for the seeming 
corruption o f the political establishment. While the BJP has evolved over the past decade 
and a hal^ there has always been the presence o f something that the BJP labels as “the 
evil”, whether h be the Congress ParQr, all other Political Parties, or secularism. While I
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am not sure all movements refy on “the eviT to sustain Aemselves, this thesis concludes 
that all political parties that are also movements refy on “the evil”.
Coalition Governments will Emerge 
As noted above, the BJP is in an electoral quandary. The question for Ae BJP is how 
to increase its popularity wiA one group and not lose its popularity wiA anoAer at Ae 
same time. The answer for the BJP is to move slowly and not to attenqn to gain all o f Ae 
seats that it needs to rule a majority government at one time. This means that, for Ae next 
five to ten years, Ae BJP will probabfy remain Ae largest political party in India, but it will 
be unable to form a government because the other political parties will stHl see the BJP as 
politically untouchable.
If Ae BJP decides to attenqA to win lots o f seats in the next election, it will probably 
see a loss in the number o f seats that it obtains. The reasoning behind this loss is that 
many o f its traditional followers will abandon it, while it will not get enough o f Ae oAer 
voters to increase its seats in parliament. Whichever scenario occurs, India is likely to see 
coalition governments rule India for the short term. The only other strong political party 
currently in India is the Congress Party and it will probably continue to decline, unless it 
does a make-over soon.
The aim o f this thesis was to understand the rhetoric o f the BJP through a meshing o f 
Ae meAods enq>k>yed by Darsey and Fr^icenberg. This method allowed Ae examiner to
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draw conclusions and gain insight on how rhetoric may evolve or regress almost 
independent^ o f the social movement.
This method also appears to be useful for future research o f other political movements. 
For Ae purposes o f  future research, additional types o f investigation should be used to 
provide fürAer msights.
First, future investigations Aould examine the recent rise o f the backward castes in Ae 
political realm in apparent opposition to the BJP. The early 1990s would be the most 
logical point to start researching this phenomenon since this is wAen these groups started 
rising in political power. However, one could also look at the early 1980's, wAen Ae 
Congress Party started abandoning Ae backward castes in as an attempt to gain the upper 
castes support.
Secondfy, future research into political movements should investigate Ae issue o f 
moderation by radical political groups and how to speed up this process. This study 
looked at the radicalization and the subsequent moderation o f the BJP. Future research 
should look at other political movements in other cultures and conq)are the BJP 
movement wiA the other movement.
Finally, future studies should look at the non-political versions o f the BJP, which are 
Ae RSS and the VHP. These studies should address how these groups interact wiA each 
oAer and wiA the BJP. Such as an investigation would perhaps be able to explain Ae 
allure o f the Hindu nationalism from a stance other than politics.
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